November 16, 2004

Appeal of

JAMES HOVANEC

LEASE AGREEMENT

PSBCA No. 4767

 

APPEARANCE FOR APPELLANT:

Edward E. Kopko, Esq.

 

APPEARANCE FOR RESPONDENT:

Margaret E. Harper, Esq.

 

OPINION OF THE BOARD

            Appellant, James Hovanec,[1] built and leased to Respondent, United States Postal Service, a post office in Willseyville, New York.  At the end of the lease’s ten-year base term, Respondent failed to exercise available renewal or purchase options and vacated the premises after a short, agreed-upon extension of its occupancy.  Appellant filed a claim against Respondent for the portion of his original project costs that he had not recovered from rents during the ten-year term.  Appellant contends that Respondent breached commitments made when entering into the lease that it would continue to lease the premises beyond the original term.  Alternatively, he argues that by failing to exercise the renewal option in the lease Respondent breached its duty of fair dealing and good faith under the lease.  The contracting officer denied the claim, and Appellant appealed.

At the parties’ election, the appeal is being decided on the record without an oral hearing.  The parties submitted additional evidence, including deposition transcripts and declarations of witnesses, and briefs in support of their positions.  The Board reserved ruling on the parties’ motions for summary judgment previously filed, but the arguments made in the motion papers have been considered in deciding this appeal.  Entitlement only is at issue (Order dated September 10, 2003).

FINDINGS OF FACT

            1.  In 1989, Respondent began a search for a replacement for the post office in Willseyville, New York.  A solicitation produced no suitable sites or buildings.  Eventually, the Willseyville Postmaster contacted Appellant, an experienced building contractor from the area, and initiated discussions encouraging him to buy a site she owned in Willseyville and to offer to build the post office on it.  At her suggestion, the project’s real estate specialist from Respondent’s Windsor, Connecticut Facilities Service Office (“FSO”) contacted Appellant.  (Appellant’s Appendix, Pages (“Appx.”) 119, 330-331; Respondent’s Exhibits, Tabs (“Resp. Exhs.”) 1, 2, 19 (p. 4)).

            2.  Appellant was initially reluctant to consider the project because he preferred to build the post office but not own it.  Over the summer of 1989, the postmaster, the real estate specialist and the contracting officer had a number of discussions with Appellant, attempting to interest him in the project.  (Appeal File, Tab (“AF”) 9; Appx. 180-182, 330-331, 466; Resp. Exhs. 19 (pp. 4-6), 24; see Resp. Exhs. 1-7).

            3.  Respondent’s officials orally advised Appellant in the course of these discussions that the Willseyville Post Office project would make a great investment for Appellant and that it would be a good source of retirement income.  They advised that the only way Appellant could lose money on the project was if Respondent determined to close the Willseyville Post Office, an event they considered unlikely under existing Postal Service policy.  They told Appellant that Respondent generally occupied leased facilities longer than the base term by exercising the options to extend the term or purchasing the post office under purchase options.  In these early discussions, Appellant believed the lease would be for a 20-year base term with an option to purchase after ten years.  (AF 9; Appx. 330-331; Resp. Exhs. 19 (pp. 4-5, 9), 24).

            4.  After many discussions over several months, Appellant offered to acquire the postmaster’s site, construct the building in accordance with Respondent’s detailed plans and lease it to Respondent at a rental of $16,344 per year.  That figure was deemed too high by Respondent, but through further negotiations between Appellant and the real estate specialist the parties reduced the scope of work—changing to a less expensive heating system and having a gravel instead of paved parking lot—and reduced the initial annual rental rate to $14,298.  (Appx. 180-182; Resp. Exhs. 1, 2).

5.  On August 24, 1989, Appellant executed a formal offer, using Respondent’s Agreement to Lease form.  In it, Appellant agreed, “upon acceptance of this agreement by the Postal Service,” to build the post office to Respondent’s design and lease it to the Postal Service for a ten-year base term at $14,298 per year followed by four, five-year option terms, exercisable by Respondent at increasing annual rental rates.  Respondent’s acceptance was to be accomplished by the contracting officer signing the Agreement.  (AF 1; Resp. Exh. 19 (pp. 4-5, 8)).

6.  Appellant, his attorney and his lender had all questioned the ten-year base term desired by Respondent.  Appellant had asked Respondent for a longer—20-year—base term, but Respondent insisted on the ten-year term (March 17 and 29, 2001 Letters to Mr. Umscheid attached to Complaint), and the ten-year term was stated in the Agreement to Lease/offer.  The offer included purchase options exercisable at Respondent’s discretion at stated prices after the first five years, at the conclusion of the base term, and at the conclusion of every renewal option term.  (AF 1; Resp. Exh. 19 (p. 9); Stipulation (“Stip.”) 1).

7.  A ten-year base term followed by a series of five-year renewal options was typical for Respondent’s new construction leases at that period of time, and the then-applicable Postal Service leasing guidelines recommended a ten- or fifteen-year term (Resp. Exhs. 22 (pp. 49, 56, 74), 23 (Handbook RE-1, Realty Acquisition and Management (1988), §321.2), 26 (p. 18)).

            8.  The contracting officer executed the Agreement to Lease/offer on September 21, 1989, accepting Appellant’s offer on Respondent’s behalf (AF 1, 4; Stip. 1).

9.  Appellant constructed the building, and the parties entered into the lease for the premises.  The lease specifically incorporated the terms of the Agreement to Lease and reflected the same terms regarding duration, renewals and purchase options that were included in the Agreement to Lease/offer.  The lease was for a ten-year base term from February 1, 1990, to January 31, 2000.  Paragraph 5 of the lease provided, “This lease may be renewed, at the option of the Postal Service, for the following separate and consecutive terms and at the following annual rentals: . . . provided that notice be given to the Lessor at least 30 days before the end of the original lease term . . ..”  Paragraph 5 provided for four, consecutive five-year renewal options.  Paragraph 30 of the lease included purchase options identical to those proposed by Appellant in his offer.  (AF 2; Appx. 119; Stip. 2, 3).

            10.  In September 1997, the Albany District of the Postal Service, which was the user of the Willseyville facility, sent to the Windsor FSO a Facilities Service Request form noting that the Willseyville lease was due to expire in January 2000, and asking the FSO to “exercise next five (5) year renewal option.”  (Appx. 035, 172; Resp. Exhs. 18, 20 (pp. 51-53), 21 (p. 11), 25 (¶2)).

11.  The real estate market in Willseyville had substantially deteriorated over the base term of the lease, and the rental rate stated in the lease’s first renewal option period was well above fair market rent for the building by 1997 (AF 7, 9; Appx. 108, 469; Resp. Exh. 25 (¶¶ 3, 4); March 2, 2001 Letter to Mr. Umscheid attached to Complaint).

12.  Postal Service guidelines addressing exercise of lease renewal options direct Respondent’s officials to conduct a market survey to assess the reasonableness of the option rental rates in the lease.  The real estate specialist in the FSO to whom the Willseyville Service Request was assigned conducted a market survey and determined that exercise of the renewal option at the rent stated in the lease was not in the interest of Respondent.  The guidelines direct that the survey be fully documented in the file, but the real estate specialist made no written record of his evaluation.  (Appx. 325 (Handbook RE-1, Realty Acquisition and Management, August 1996, §316.12); Resp. Exhs. 20 (pp. 8-9, 11-13, 18-19), 21 (pp. 9-12), 25 (¶¶ 3, 4)).

13.  If the option rent in the lease was determined to exceed market rent, the Postal Service leasing guidelines instructed Respondent’s officials to attempt to negotiate the renewal option rent to correspond to market rent (Resp. Exh. 21 (p. 2), 22 (pp. 51, 90); Appx. 325 (Handbook RE-1, Realty Acquisition and Management, August 1996, §316.122)).

            14.  Sometime after September 1997 and before March 2, 1998 (AF 20), the real estate specialist obtained from the lease file the telephone number listed for Appellant.  He called the number to attempt to negotiate a lower rental for the renewal period and spoke to someone he believed to be Appellant’s wife.  The person he spoke to told him the rent for the first option period was not negotiable—to pay it or move out.  Appellant’s wife denies he spoke to her, and the real estate specialist never contacted Appellant directly to discuss a reduced rent for the renewal term.  Because of the undisputed substantial decline in the Willseyville real estate market, Appellant would have been willing to negotiate with respect to the rent for the option renewal period.  (AF 7, 8, 20; Appx. 033-034,195, 332; Resp. Exhs. 15, 16, 17, 20 (p. 14), 21 (p. 1-4, 8), 25 (¶¶ 5, 6); March 2, 2001 Letter to Mr. Umscheid attached to Complaint).

            15.  The real estate specialist made no written record of the conversation with the person he believed to be Appellant’s wife and did not confirm in writing or orally directly with Appellant his understanding that the option rent was non-negotiable.  (AF 20; Appx. 107-110; Resp. Exh. 25 (¶¶7-10)).  Nevertheless, based on that single telephone conversation, the real estate specialist notified the Albany District Office that the option rent exceeded market rent and that the lessor refused to negotiate a lower rent.  He then began the process of finding other space for the Willseyville Post Office.  Eventually, he located a vacant site, which Respondent leased.  Respondent obtained necessary approvals and installed a modular building on the new site for a total long-term cost substantially less than would have been experienced had Respondent exercised the options in the lease at the rates stated therein.  (Appx. 071, 097, 103-104, 108-110, 149-150, 153-156; Resp. Exhs. 8-14, 17, 20 (pp. 15, 22, 25, 38, 46), 21 (pp. 2-4, 18)).

            16.  The postmaster knew of the search for new space no later than March 10, 1998, but never told Appellant about it notwithstanding regular contact with him at the post office.  Appellant had asked her several times in 1997 and 1998 when he could expect notification of the renewal, and she told him the matter was handled by the Albany District Office.  (AF 10, 20; Appx. 042, 119; Resp. Exhs. 8, 19 (p. 11)).

            17.  About a year or so before expiration of the lease, Appellant called the Windsor FSO, intending to ask about the renewal option.  His call was not returned, and he did not call again.  (Resp. Exh. 19 (p. 11); see Appx. 370).

            18.  On December 7, 1999, the Windsor real estate specialist called Appellant’s home and spoke to Appellant’s wife.  He advised that Respondent would not be able to vacate as planned by the end of the base term, January 31, 2000, and asked if Appellant would be willing to extend the term of the lease by six months.  His wife’s report of this call was the first notice to Appellant that Respondent intended to move from his building.  (AF 6, 7; Appx. 033, 120, 121, 332, 345; Resp. Exhs. 16, 21 (p. 8)).

            19.  On December 21, 1999, the parties entered into a six-month extension of the lease at the annual rental rate stated in the lease for the first renewal option period, and Respondent vacated by the end of the extension period (AF 3, 13, 14; Appx. 333; Stip. 4).

            20.  The sole reason Respondent relocated was economic.  Appellant’s building was adequate for Respondent’s purposes, and if a sufficient reduction in the rent for the option period could have been negotiated, Respondent would not have relocated.  However, by December 1999, when the real estate specialist contacted Appellant about the six-month extension, the new site had been leased, site improvements made and the modular building was being manufactured.  By this time, Respondent considered the new project to be too far advanced to reverse.  (Appx. 098,116, 229; Resp. Exhs. 20 (pp. 9-10, 20, 32, 35), 21 (pp. 6-7, 14)).

            21.  Respondent’s real estate guidelines direct Respondent to monitor leases with purchase options to determine the benefits of acquiring the facility and to consider any proposals made by an owner of an existing postal-leased facility (Appx. 030 (Handbook RE-1, Realty Acquisition and Management, August 1996, Section 482)).  Throughout 1998 and 1999, Respondent gave no consideration to purchasing Appellant’s building (Appx. 006-007). 

            22.  By letter dated November 27, 2000, Appellant submitted a claim for $46,800, which, according to Appellant, is the amount necessary to allow him to recover his investment in the project.  He claimed it was Respondent’s failure to exercise the option to renew that caused the claimed loss.  (AF 16, 17).

            23.  By final decision dated February 9, 2001, the contracting officer denied the claim, and Appellant appealed (AF 18, 19; Appx. 159-160).

DECISION

Term of the Lease

Appellant argues that Respondent’s officials, through their representations when the lease was entered into in 1989, established a 20-year term for the lease or an obligation on Respondent’s part to exercise the renewal options to produce a 20-year occupancy.  Because, according to Appellant, he based his rental proposal on that expected 20-year occupancy, Respondent’s departure shortly after expiration of the ten-year base term left him unable to recover his investment in the Willseyville Post Office project, and he seeks in this proceeding to recover the portion of his investment that he did not recover from the rents paid by Respondent during its occupancy of the post office. 

Respondent argues that the lease, which incorporates the terms of the Agreement to Lease, is an integrated document, representing all agreements of the parties.  Accordingly, Respondent argues, evidence regarding representations or negotiations leading up to the parties’ agreement should not be permitted to vary or contradict the lease’s plain language regarding its duration and the discretion afforded Respondent regarding exercise of the renewal options.  Respondent further argues that even considering the parties' negotiations, Appellant has not shown he is entitled to relief.

The parties contemplated that the formal offer and acceptance would occur through Appellant’s submission and Respondent’s acceptance of a written Agreement to Lease (Findings 5, 9).  The Agreement to Lease and the resulting lease executed by the parties were comprehensive and addressed in detail the duration of the lease:  a ten-year base term followed by four, five-year renewal terms, exercisable at the option of Respondent (Findings 6, 10).  Not only did the language of the Agreement to Lease unambiguously establish a ten-year base term, but Appellant knew it and had unsuccessfully attempted to persuade Respondent to change the arrangement to reflect the 20-year term he desired (Finding 6).

Various statements of Respondent’s officials to the effect that the project was a good investment for Appellant (Finding 3) were statements of opinion, and we are not persuaded that Appellant would have been reasonable in relying on such statements to conclude that the lease duration and other terms were anything other than as written in the Agreement to Lease and the lease.  See Brenda R. Ronhaar, AGBCA No. 98-147-1, 99-1 BCA ¶ 30,591 at 151,075; Aspen Helicopters, Inc. v. Department of Commerce, GSBCA No. 13258-COM, 00-2 BCA ¶ 30,581 at 151,025, aff’d, 243 F.3d 561 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (Table).

Finally, the statements attributed to Respondent’s officials have not been shown to be intended to mislead Appellant.  As far as this record reflects, Respondent’s officials believed their representations accurately stated the general experience with Postal Service leases.  Certainly none expected the developments in 1998 that led to non-renewal of the lease.  That the representations were not intentionally misleading or otherwise reflective of affirmative misconduct by Respondent’s officials prevents assertion of estoppel against Respondent under the circumstances of this appeal.  See Rumsfeld v. United Technologies Corp., 315 F.3d 1361, 1377 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 124 S.Ct. 532 (2003); DeMarco Durzo Development Co. v. United States, 60 Fed. Cl. 632, 638 (2004).

Thus, Appellant has not shown that the parties through their lease negotiations varied the plain language of the lease regarding duration and renewal options.

Failure of Respondent to Exercise Renewal Option

Appellant argues that the conduct of Respondent’s officials when considering whether to exercise the renewal options at the end of the base term violated the duty of fair dealing and good faith inherent in the contract between the parties.  However, as we have found no limitations in the Agreement to Lease or in the lease on Respondent’s exercise or nonexercise of the renewal option and have held that the conduct of Respondent’s officials prior to entering into the Agreement to Lease did not commit Respondent to exercise the renewal option, Respondent had broad discretion in this regard.  See Government Systems Advisors, Inc. v. United States, 847 F.2d 811, 813 (Fed. Cir. 1988); Defense Systems Co., ASBCA No. 50918, 00-2 BCA ¶ 30,991 at 153,006.  Consequently, Respondent’s failure to exercise the option to extend its occupancy does not entitle Appellant to contractual relief absent a showing that the failure resulted from Respondent’s bad faith or abuse of discretion.  See Aspen Helicopters, Inc. v. Department of Commerce, GSBCA No. 13258-COM, 99-2 BCA ¶ 30,581 at 151,024, aff’d, 243 F.3d 561 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (Table); Plum Run, Inc., ASBCA Nos. 46091, 49203, 49207, 97-2 BCA ¶ 29,193 at 145,230; Steven S. Freedman, PSBCA No. 3867, 96-1 BCA ¶ 28,170.

For the Board to find bad faith on the part of Respondent’s employees, Appellant must show by clear and convincing evidence some specific intent to harm him, see Am-Pro Protective Agency, Inc. v. United States, 281 F. 3d 1234, 1240 (Fed. Cir. 2002); Henry H. Norman v. General Services Administration, GSBCA Nos. 15070, 15189, 15252, 02-2 BCA ¶ 32,042 at 158,355, and Appellant has not met that standard.  Demonstrating sloppy contract administration, which Appellant has done here, is not enough.  Lopez Machine Works, Inc., ASBCA No. 45509, 97-1 BCA ¶ 28,622 at 142,910; accord Benju Corp., ASBCA No. 43648, et al., 97-2 BCA ¶ 29,274, at 145,657, aff’d, 178 F.3d 1312 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (Table).  There is no evidence that Respondent’s officials had the requisite “specific intent to injure” Appellant, that they were “motivated alone by malice,” that they engaged in a “proven conspiracy to get rid of” Appellant or employed “designedly oppressive” measures.  See Am-Pro Protective Agency, Inc. v. United States, 281 F. 3d 1234, 1240 (Fed. Cir. 2002).

Appellant’s suspicion that the postmaster might have had personal gain as a reason to end the lease and to fail to inform him that plans for a new facility were underway (Finding 18) is not sufficient to demonstrate bad faith.  See CACI, Inc. – Federal v. United States, 719 F.2d 1567, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1983); J. Cooper & Assocs., Inc. v. United States, 53 Fed. Cl. 8, 25 (2002), aff’d, 65 Fed. Appx. 731 (2003) (Table).  Likewise, his argument that Respondent relied on a false report of structural damage to his post office as a reason for vacating does not support a finding of bad faith.  Although there is discussion of a structural problem in correspondence addressing relocation of the post office, the sole reason for finding new space was that the rent was above market and Respondent understood that it was nonnegotiable (Finding 20).

The elements of abuse of discretion have also not been demonstrated.  As discussed above, there was no subjective bad faith shown.  Additionally, Respondent’s discretion to determine whether to exercise the renewal option was not restricted in the contract, and, finally, there was a clearly reasonable basis for not exercising the renewal option contained in the lease: the renewal rental was no longer justifiable on an economic basis, given the decline in the Willseyville real estate market (Findings 8, 13).  See Kirk/Marsland Advertising, Inc., ASBCA No. 51075, 99-2 BCA ¶ 30,439 at 150,408-409; Pennyrile Plumbing, Inc., ASBCA Nos. 44555, 47086, 96-1 BCA ¶ 28,044 at 140,029.

Appellant points to failures of the Windsor real estate specialist to follow the real estate leasing guidelines set forth in Respondent’s RE-1 Handbook as evidence of bad faith and a basis for his recovery.  The real estate specialist failed to document his market evaluation, failed to contact Appellant to propose negotiations after determining that the renewal rental rate was too high and failed to make any record of his attempt to contact Appellant, all contrary to instructions in Respondent’s Real Estate Handbook.  Also, according to Appellant, the specialist violated the Handbook when he failed to consider purchasing the Willseyville post office.  (Findings 11, 14, 15, 17, 23).  However, the RE-1 Handbook only reflects guidance to Respondent’s officials in performance of their duties on behalf of Respondent and exists for the benefit of Respondent and not its lessors.  Accordingly, Appellant does not have contractually enforceable rights against Respondent for Respondent’s officials’ failure to comply with the Handbook directions.  See Freightliner Corp. v. Caldera, 225 F.3d 1361, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2000); AFV Enterprises, Inc., PSBCA Nos. 2691, 3316, 01-1 BCA ¶ 31,388 at 155,023; TPI International Airways, Inc., ASBCA No. 46462, 96-2 BCA ¶ 28,602, aff’d,135 F.3d 776 (Fed. Cir.) (Table), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 874 (1998).

The appeal is denied.

Norman D. Menegat

Administrative Judge

Board Member

 

I concur:

James A. Cohen

Administrative Judge

Chairman

 

I concur:

David I. Brochstein

Administrative Judge

Vice Chairman

 



[1] Although both Marge Hovanec and James Hovanec are listed as appellants in this appeal, only James Hovanec is the lessor/contractor and, therefore, is the appellant in the appeal.  The caption of the appeal has been changed accordingly.