January 27, 1994

Appeal of

ROBERT EARL LANIER

Under Contract No. HCR 27984

PSBCA No. 3143

 

APPEARANCE FOR APPELLANT:

John A. Mauney, Esq.

 

APPEARANCE FOR RESPONDENT:

B. J. Meadows, III, Esq.

 

OPINION OF THE BOARD

 

            Appellant has filed an appeal from a Contracting Officer's decision terminating Appellant's highway transportation contract for default.  A hearing, limited to the issue of the propriety of the default termination, was held at Appellant's request.

FINDINGS OF FACT

 

            1.  Appellant was awarded contract number HCR 27984 on May 25, 1990.  Under its terms Appellant was to provide daily box delivery service in Kitty Hawk, North Carolina, for an annual contract price of $21,967.47.  As part of the delivery service Appellant was also required to case the mail and load it into his vehicle.  The contract service commenced on July 1, 1990, and was scheduled to end on June 30, 1994 (Appeal File (AF)-1, 3).

            2.  The contract's General Provision (PS Form 7407T, March 1989) contained a "Termination By the Postal Service for Default" provision which stated in pertinent part:

(a)  The contracting officer may terminate this contract for

default:

 

(1)  For Contractor's failure to perform service according to the terms of  the contract.

 

(2)  If the Contractor is the subject of administratively determined violations of the postal laws and regulations and other laws related to the performance of the service;

 

(3)  For the Contractor's disobedience of the instructions of the contracting officer; [or]

 

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(7)  If the Contractor . . . (c) is not reliable, trustworthy, or of good character.

 

            The clause provided that if a default was subsequently found to be excusable it would be treated as a termination for convenience (AF-6).

            Clause 3, "Law and Regulations Applicable," of the contract's General Provisions states:

This contract and the services performed thereunder are subject to applicable laws and regulations made pursuant thereto.  The Contractor shall faithfully discharge all duties and trusts imposed upon him by such laws and regulations (AF-6).

 

            3.  Title 29 of the Code of Federal Regulations, Section 1604.11, Sexual Harassment, states, in relevant part:

(a)  Harassment on the basis of sex is a violation of section 703 of title VII.  Unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature constitute sexual harassment when . . . such conduct has the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with an individual's work performance or creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive working environment.

 

* * *

 

(e)  An employer may also be responsible for the acts of non-employees, with respect to sexual harassment of employees in the workplace, where the employer (or its agents or supervisory employees) knows or should have known of the conduct and fails to take immediate and appropriate corrective action. . . . (AF-40)

 

            4.  Title 39 of the Code of Federal Regulations, Part 232, Conduct on Postal Property, states, in relevant part:

§231.1  "(a)  Applicability.  This section applies to all real property under the charge and control of the Postal Service, to all tenant agencies, and to all persons entering in or on such property.  This section shall be posted and kept posted at a conspicuous place on all such property.

 

* * *

 

(e)  Disturbances.  Disorderly conduct, or conduct which creates loud and unusual noise, or which obstructs the usual use of entrances, foyers, corridors, offices, elevators, stairways, and parking lots, or which otherwise tends to impede or disturb the public employees in the performance of their duties, . . . is prohibited."  (AF-37)

 

            5.  During the first couple of months of Appellant's contract the Kitty Hawk Postmaster rated Appellant's performance as very good and commended him and also found him to be trustworthy (Transcript (Tr.) 46-47).  Appellant generally performed his job as required.  However, he had an aggressive personality and was outspoken and somewhat abrasive (Tr. 32, 177-78, 223-24).

            6.  In August 1990, the Kitty Hawk Postmaster instructed Appellant to forward certain mail addressed to the Buccaneer Motel.  On May 31, 1991, Appellant apparently did not forward some mail addressed to the Buccaneer Motel and on June 3, 1991, was orally reprimanded by the Postmaster.  On August 3, 1991, the Postmaster issued Appellant a PS Form 5500 "Report of Contract Route Irregularity" for failure to forward Buccaneer Motel mail.  Another Form 5500 was issued to Appellant on August 17, 1991, for failure to respond to the August 3 Form 5500 (AF-14-18; Tr. 27-28).

            7.  On August 19, 1991, the postmaster admonished Appellant for discussing with a customer or patron the relocation of a collection box and moving the box.  According to the Postmaster relocation matters and discussions were within her domain, not Appellant's (Tr. 29; AF-19).

            8.  On August 29, 1991, the Postmaster admonished Appellant for being rude to a customer who was parked in front of a collection box in a fire lane.  Appellant stated that he would call the customer and apologize (Tr. 31; AF-21).

            9.  On September 16, 1991, a Form 5500 was issued to Appellant for using a marker on a customer's or patron's mail box in order to relocate the address shown on the box to the proper location.  Appellant did not respond to the 5500 (AF-22).

            10.  Another Form 5500 was issued to Appellant on October 22, 1991, for deviating from the line of travel set forth in his contract.  The deviation occurred because Appellant had authorized some customers to relocate their mail boxes off the contract's line of travel, i.e., from the end of  a cul-de-sac to a house front (AF-24-25; Tr. 203).  Appellant had no authority to permit the relocation of boxes on his route (Tr. 67-70; AF-24).

            11.  During the period of Appellant's contract, physical contact in the form of bumping occurred between Appellant and the Kitty Hawk Postmaster in the interior of the Post Office when they were casing the mail.  These instances of bumping, which the Postmaster believed to be initiated by Appellant, occurred four or five times.  The Postmaster was of the opinion the bumpings were intentional acts of intimidation but were not sexually prompted or oriented  (AF-33; Tr. 16-17, 48-49, 62).  The Postmaster never discussed the bumping incidents with Appellant (Tr. 61).

            12.  The interior of the Kitty Hawk Post Office was very small and cramped with 11-13 Postal Service employees and contract "employees" working together (Tr. 18, 49, 81, 175, 219).  Due to the small and cramped quarters in which these employees worked bumping and brushing against each other often occurred (Tr. 50, 81, 97, 175, 219).

            13.  On October 9, 1991, a clerk and safety officer at the Kitty Hawk Post Office gave a presentation on sexual harassment to contractors and Postal Service employees working at the Post Office at the request of a female contractor, Ms. Francis, who believed that one of her substitute carriers was being intentionally bumped by Appellant (AF-33; Tr. 226-28).  At that time the Postmaster observed Appellant bump into Ms. Francis.  In a subsequent conversation between the Postmaster and Ms. Francis, Ms. Francis advised the Postmaster that she (Ms. Francis) and others were being bumped intentionally by Appellant (Tr. 19-23; AF-33).

            14.  On October 9 and 10, 1991, the Postmaster telephoned Postal Service higher management and relayed the information pertaining to the perceived intentional bumping by Appellant. She was advised that a Postal Service equal employment opportunity investigator would investigate the matter and was told not to speak to Appellant about it (Tr. 24-25; AF-33).

            15.  The investigator interviewed the Postmaster, Ms. Francis, and two other females who were substitute drivers.  The latter three advised the investigator that Appellant had made untoward sexual comments to them and had intentionally rubbed or bumped against them.  Ms. Francis and one of the substitutes never confronted Appellant nor voiced any objections to him pertaining to his actions (Tr. 86, 116, 130-34; AF-33).  The other substitute specifically conveyed her displeasure to Appellant as to his sexual comments, which she found offensive, and no further comments of that nature were made by Appellant to her (Tr. 86-91).  However, incidents of bumping occurred thereafter (Tr.93).  No mention of these actions was made by these individuals to the Postmaster until her discussion with Ms. Francis on October 9, 1991 (Tr. 19, 87, 116; AF-33).  One substitute driver who worked for Appellant resigned primarily because Appellant was not paying her in a timely manner, but also because of the bumping and sexual comments made to her which she found intimidating (Tr. 115, 120-24). The other substitute driver who worked for Ms. Francis resigned her position because of Appellant's actions (Tr. 85-90; AF-33).

            16.  The Postal Inspection Service thereafter conducted an investigation of Appellant's actions.  In addition to those previously interviewed (Finding of Fact No. 15) three additional female substitute contract drivers and one female contractor were interviewed and all charged that Appellant had either intentionally brushed against them or bumped them.  Two of the drivers related that Appellant had used vulgar or inappropriate language to them (Tr. 75, 96; AF-33).  The record does not indicate that Appellant was directly confronted by any of the three substitutes pertaining to his actions, nor did  they bring these matters to the attention of the Postmaster until after October 9, 1991 (AF-33; Tr. 75, 96).  The female contractor who was interviewed was bumped once by Appellant, but after she admonished him, she was never again bumped by him  (Tr. 105).

            17.  Those interviewed by the equal employment opportunity investigator and  the Postal Inspector believed Appellant's actions created a hostile or abusive work environment (AF-33; Tr. 76-77, 85-87, 97, 116-17).

            18.  It was not unusual for off-color, vulgar, or inappropriate language or jokes of a sexual matter to be related on the workroom floor of the Kitty Hawk Post Office.  Both male and female workers participated in these exchanges (Tr.  86, 95, 98, 127-28, 176, 219).

            19.  On November 5, 1991, the Transportation Management Service Center (TMSC), Landover, MD, Contracting Officer by certified letter denied Appellant access to the mail "as a result of charges of sexual harassment [sic] filed against you." Appellant was asked to turn in his identification badge, but was "reminded that this action does not relieve you of the obligations you assumed when awarded this contract. . . ." (AF-10).

            20.  Subsequent to Appellant being denied access to the mail (and the Kitty Hawk Post Office) a substitute driver unfamiliar with Appellant's route performed the route alone. During the period of November 20, 1991, to December  20, 1991, there were several instances of misdelivered mail but no Form 5500's were issued to Appellant (AF-26-32).

            21.  The Postal Inspectors thereafter prepared a report dated December 10, 1991.  The report only contained information and statements from those who stated that Appellant was touching, bumping, or sexually harassing them.  Other females who worked in the Kitty Hawk Post Office were interviewed and had encountered no untoward actions by Appellant.  Factual information as to these  interviews was omitted from the Inspectors' report (Tr. 146-47, 159-163).  In fact five other females who worked at the Kitty Hawk Post Office at the same time as Appellant neither observed nor encountered any such actions (Tr. 196).

            22.  On December 17, 1991, the TMSC Contracting Officer notified Appellant in writing that his contract was terminated for default pursuant to clause 16(a)(7) of the contract's General Provisions (supra).  According to the letter the decision to terminate was based upon "the sexual harassment [sic] charges filed against you," as discussed in the findings of the Postal Inspection Service investigative memorandum (AF-11).  Appellant thereafter appealed the termination action (AF-12).

DECISION

            Respondent, as the party that initiated the default termination, has the burden of demonstrating that the termination was proper.  Lisbon Contractors, Inc. v. United States, 828 F.2d 759 (Fed. Cir. 1987).  Respondent contends the termination action was proper on several grounds.  Initially, Respondent argues that Appellant's actions toward female workers at the Kitty Hawk Post Office supported the determination that he was of poor character, thereby justifying the termination. Next Respondent contends that Appellant's alleged offensive and intimidating actions constituted major irregularities, as defined in Respondent's Procurement Manual, thereby supporting the termination. Respondent also alleges Appellant's actions violated Postal Service standards of conduct on Postal property and violated federal employment law.  Finally Respondent contends that Appellant's contract performance was sufficiently deficient to require a termination.  For this latter contention Respondent relies on those instances of irregularities described in Findings of Fact Nos. 6-10 and 20.

            Appellant contends the termination action was improper because the investigative report relied upon by the Contracting Officer as the basis for the termination action was flawed, incomplete and biased.  In this regard Appellant vigorously attacks the report for failing to include any information for the Contracting Officer to consider that five other females who worked at the Kitty Hawk Post Office who were interviewed had no knowledge of any offensive actions committed by Appellant, nor had they themselves encountered any such actions.  Appellant also complains that the report was incomplete as it failed to contain any reference to an ancillary complaint about a kick-back received by Appellant, which was subsequently found to be absolutely untrue.[1]  Finally, Appellant argues that his actions were not extraordinary, that a pervasive atmosphere of crude language and exchange of sexual jokes existed at the Kitty Hawk Post Office, and that bumping between individuals often occurred due to the cramped working space.

            Sexual harassment, the primary basis for the termination action, is defined as conduct that is severe or pervasive enough to create an objectively hostile or abusive work environment - one that a reasonable person would find hostile or abusive. Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., ___ U.S. ___, 62 L.W. 4004, 1993 U.S. Lexis 7155 (November 9, 1993).  "[W]hether an environment is 'hostile' or 'abusive' can be determined only by looking at all the circumstances.  These may include the frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee's work performance."  Id.

            The evidence presented by Respondent pertaining to Appellant's actions establishes that his conduct created an objectively hostile or abusive work environment.  Seven females, either contractors or drivers, charged that Appellant had either intentionally brushed against them or bumped them. These instances of bumping and touching were not isolated.  The rubbing and bumping, coupled with Appellant's vulgar or inappropriate language, created a work environment that these individuals felt was hostile.   These actions caused tension in the workplace and affected the ability of the these individuals to do their work.  In fact, one substitute driver resigned her position solely because of Appellant's actions. While it is true that the working quarters were cramped, and some bumping between individuals (including Appellant) accidently occurred, the frequency of Appellant's actions cannot reasonably or objectively lead to the conclusion that they were accidental. Nor does the fact that off-color, vulgar or inappropriate language or jokes were often heard on the workroom floor diminish Appellant's actions.  Some of those that he bumped were offended or intimidated by his remarks directed specifically to them (FOF No. 15).

            Appellant's conduct impeded or disturbed the Postal employees, including contractors, in the performance of their duties and thus violated Postal Service regulations pertaining to conduct on Postal property (FOF No. 4), and the "Laws and Regulations Applicable" clause of the contract (FOF No. 2).  Accordingly, sufficient grounds existed for termination of his contract under clause 16(a)(2) of the general provisions (FOF No. 2).  Pascal Redfern, PSBCA No. 1512, 87-1 BCA P 19,646; Eddy M. Acevedo, PSBCA No. 3217, 93-1 BCA ¶ 25,493.

            The Contracting Officer terminated Appellant's contract pursuant to clause 16(a)(7) of the contract's General Provisions for not being of good character.  The reference to 16(a)(7), rather than 16(a)(2), is not significant however, as the underlying basis for the termination was the sexual harassment actions of Appellant which violated both postal regulations and Appellant's contract.

            It is of no consequence that those offended and/or harassed by Appellant's actions with limited exceptions did not confront Appellant and demand that he cease.  Appellant is an intimidating person with an aggressive personality, which factors undoubtedly kept personal confrontation by others to a minimum.

            As Appellant contends, the investigative report, prepared by the Postal Inspectors was, at least somewhat, incomplete. Nevertheless, the described incidents clearly supported the determination of sexual harassment.

            Appellant's contract was properly terminated for default for the reasons stated above.  It is therefore unnecessary to address Respondent's other contentions in support of the termination.  The appeal is denied.

James D. Finn, Jr.

Administrative Judge

Vice Chairman

 

I Concur:

James A. Cohen

Administrative Judge

Chairman

 

I Concur:

David I. Brochstein

Administrative Judge

Board Member



            [1] The evidence in the record on this matter is very sketchy and the kick-back allegation was not a basis for the termination.  It has no relevance to the issue of the propriety of the termination.