February 12, 1993

Appeal of

ROGER H. ELLIOTT

Under Lease Agreement

PSBCA No. 3285

 

APPEARANCE FOR APPELLANT:

Roger H. Elliott

 

APPEARANCE FOR RESPONDENT:

Robert E. O'Connell, Esq.

 

OPINION OF THE BOARD

 

            Appellant, Roger H. Elliott, a Postal Service lessor, has filed an appeal from a Contracting Officer's final decision which denied Appellant's claim for reimbursement of payments Appellant made to Madison County, Montana, for solid waste charges against Appellant's property.  The appeal was submitted on the record without a hearing and is being processed under the Board's accelerated procedure.  Only entitlement is being decided.

Findings of Fact

            1.  On August 14, 1981, Appellant and Respondent, United States Postal Service, entered into a lease under which Appellant agreed to lease a facility in Sheridan, Madison County, Montana, to Respondent for a period of three years commencing April 1, 1982, at a monthly rental of $660.  The lease contained three two-year renewal options at higher rental amounts (Appeal File (AF-) 1).

            2.  The lease provided that, ". . . the Postal Service [sic] to be responsible for all utility service billings."  In fulfilling this responsibility, Respondent paid for trash and garbage pick-up (AF-16).

            3.  The lease further provided that Respondent would pay to the lessor as additional rent the net amount of general real estate taxes by check made payable jointly to the lessor and the taxing authority issuing the tax bill.  It also stated that "the lessor shall pay all assessments and fees of every kind and nature other than general real estate taxes" (AF-1).

            4.  In 1982 Madison County, Montana, formed a county-wide solid waste district for the purpose of disposal of solid waste.  In order to pay for implementation of the program, service fees were established for both household and commercial entities (AF-24, 27).

            5.  Appellant's real property tax notices from Madison County, Montana, for the Sheridan Post Office for the years 1983-1991 all contained a line item designated "Solid Waste."  The yearly amount assessed varied from $64 to $116.60 (AF-2, 6, 8, 10, 12, 14, 17, 20, 22).

            6.  Each year that Appellant received the real property tax notice he forwarded it to Respondent and requested payment of the full amount, including the solid waste charge (AF-2, 4, 6, 12, 14, 17, 20, 22).

            7.  Respondent declined to reimburse Appellant for the solid waste charge for the years 1983-1991, on the basis that the charge was a special assessment, not part of the general real estate taxes, and therefore Appellant's responsibility to pay as lessor.  Respondent otherwise paid Appellant in full for the general real estate taxes assessed by the tax notices (AF-3, 5, 7, 9, 11, 13, 15, 18, 21, 23).

            8.  A new lease for the same premises was executed by the parties on March 7, 1990.  The lease term was to begin April 1, 1991, and end March 31, 1994.  The monthly rental amount was $825.  The lease contained a clause entitled "Reimbursement of Paid Taxes" which stated that Respondent would reimburse the lessor, as additional rent, all general real estate taxes levied on the property which the lessor was required to pay.  The clause further provided that "[t]he lessor must pay all assessments and fees of every kind and nature other than general real estate taxes without reimbursement by the Postal Service;" and "In no event will assessments, 'special assessments' or like charges be considered general real estate taxes under the terms of this lease."  The lease stated that Appellant would furnish as utilities "all systems and equipment as presently installed," but Respondent agreed to continue to pay all utility bills (AF-19).  Reimbursement of Appellant for payment of the solid waste charge on the tax bills was not an item discussed in the lease negotiations (Declaration of Marcus K. Nielsen).

            9.  By letter dated February 11, 1992, to Respondent's Contracting Officer, Appellant requested reimbursement of $946.72, representing the total amount of solid waste fees he had paid for the years 1983-1991 (AF-24).

            10.  By final decision dated April 9, 1992, the Contracting Officer denied Appellant's request based upon the language of the "Reimbursement of Paid Taxes" clause of the March 7, 1990 lease (AF-26).  This appeal followed.

Decision

            Appellant contends that he should be reimbursed for the solid waste fees since Respondent agreed to pay for all utilities and in fact paid for garbage pick-up as a utility cost during the terms of the leases.  Thus, reasons Appellant, Respondent likewise implicitly agreed to pay for treatment and disposal of the garbage by the county's solid waste district.  Respondent, in opposing Appellant's claim, argues that the solid waste charge contained on the tax bills is a special assessment, the payment of which is Appellant's responsibility under  both leases.

            Appellant, as the party seeking entitlement, has the burden of proof in this appeal.  F&B Realty, PSBCA No. 2529, 91-2 BCA ¶ 23,788.  Appellant, however, has presented no evidence in support of his argument that the solid waste treatment and disposal charge shown on the county real property bills should be included as a utility cost under the leases with Respondent.  There are no affidavits or declarations in this regard.  There is no documentation of lease negotiations which would support such a conclusion.  In fact, a record of lease negotiations of the 1990 lease prepared by Respondent's realty specialist lists water, sewer, electricity, and fuel costs as Respondent's obligations but makes no mention of solid waste costs.  Appellant's argument thus has no merit.

            Moreover, both leases provided that general real estate taxes were ultimately Respondent's obligations.  Both also made other assessments and fees or special assessments exclusively Appellant's obligations.  The solid waste charge in issue is more akin to a special assessment than a general real estate tax.  S. S. Silberblatt Inc. v. United States, 888 F.2d 829 (Fed. Cir. 1989); Alvin Ltd. v. United States, 816 F.2d 1562 (Fed. Cir. 1987); Appeal of S. S. Silberblatt, Inc., PSBCA No. 1245, 1383, 1414, 89-1 BCA ¶ 21,268; Elsie C. Fiorio, PSBCA No. 2832, 92-1 BCA ¶ 24,398; Northwestern Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. State Board of Equalization, 166 P.2 917, 919 (Cal. 1946); American Co. v. City of Lakeport, 32 P.2d 622, 628 (Cal. 1934); Lechner v. City of Billings, 797 P.2d 191, 199 (Mont. 1990); State ex rel. Malott v. Board of County Comm'rs of Cascade County, 296 P. 1, 14 (Mont. 1931).

            Appellant has not supplied evidence such as affidavits from experts or other evidence which would support a conclusion that the solid waste charge should be categorized as a component of general real estate taxes and thus a lease payment obligation of Respondent.  Accordingly, Appellant has failed to prove any basis for entitlement.

            The Contracting Officer's reliance on only the March 1990 lease in denying Appellant's claim is of no assistance to Appellant.  The leases were virtually identical in regard to the responsibilities of the parties for payment of utilities and general real estate taxes and special assessments.  Appellant has not proven entitlement to recover under the provisions of either lease.  The appeal is denied.

James D. Finn, Jr.

Administrative Judge

Vice Chairman

 

I concur:

James A. Cohen

Administrative Judge

Chairman