August 26, 1986

APPEAL OF

LAWRENCE D. BANE

UNDER CONTRACT NO. HCR 47233

PSBCA NOS. 1440, 1491

APPEARANCE FOR APPELLANT:

Lawrence D. Bane

APPEARANCE FOR RESPONDENT:

Maria R. Fuhrmann, Esq.

OPINION OF THE BOARD ON SECOND MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION

By a “Respondent to Decision of Board” filed August 21, 1986, appellant objects to the Board’s Opinion dated August 13, 1986, on his Motion for Reconsideration. His “Respondent to Respondent’s Response to Appellant’s Motion for Reconsideration” dated August 12, 1986, was received by the Board on August 18, 1986, after issuance of the Opinion dated August 13, 1986.

Appellant requests the Board to reverse this Opinion on the following grounds: he had a right to respond to Respondent’s Response to the Motion; he did not have the same amount of time to file that Respondent had; the Board did not inform him all evidence had to be in on a definite date; and the Board did not consider all the evidence that was presented to it.

Appellant’s right to seek reconsideration of the board’s decision is governed by the Board’s rules of practice, specifically 39 C.F.R. § 955.30. That rule does ot provide for a response to the other party’s reply to a motion for reconsideration. Rather, it contemplates that all grounds relied upon to sustain the motion be “set forth specifically” in the motion. Therefore, Appellant had no right to provided by the rules to file a response, and he was required to submit all information with his motion. The Board did grant Appellant several time extensions to file the motion. Thus, he had more time than the 30 days contemplated by the rule to file the motion.

There is no provision in the rules for reconsidering a decision on a motion for reconsideration. Nevertheless, all of Appellant’s submissions have been considered. Even assuming as true his assertion that there was a hazardous dock plate at the North Vernon, Indiana Post Office, that fact alone did not warrant his refusal to perform the contract. Other assertions of Appellant have been previously addressed.

The matter of the termination of the contract has become final. The Board will not consider any further submissions by Appellant seeking to overcome that determination. As previously noted in the Opinion dated August 13, 1986, the decision on the termination does not bar Appellant from filing a claim with the Contracting Officer and requesting a final decision on any claim arising under the contract apart from the termination and excess reprocurement determinations that are now final.

Joan B. Thompson

Administrative Judge

Board Member

I concur:

James A. Cohen

Administrative Judge

Chairman