June 18, 2001

In the Matter of the Petition by

GEORGE J. DEVOS
P.O. Box 3063
Apple Valley, CA 92307-0058

Appeal of Termination of Group E
Post Office Box Service
P.S. Docket No. POB 01-111

APPEARANCE FOR PETITIONER:
George J. DeVos
P.O. Box 3063
Apple Valley, CA 92307-0058

APPEARANCE FOR RESPONDENT:
Catherine A. Green, Esq.
Corporate Law Section
United States Postal Service
475 L’Enfant Plaza, SW, Room 6403
Washington, DC 20260-1135

This proceeding arises from a Petition filed by Mr. DeVos after being notified by the Apple Valley, California Postmaster that he was no longer entitled to free post office box service.

Respondent, the United States Postal Service, filed an Answer to the Petition, along with a Motion for Summary Judgment, arguing that there were no material facts in issue and that Respondent was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Attached to the motion was a sworn declaration from the Apple Valley Postmaster, Donald E. Reddig. Petitioner was given an opportunity to reply to the motion, and he did so. The following findings of fact are based on all the material submitted by the parties.

1. For some time before March 2001, Petitioner received mail at a post office box in the Apple Valley, California Post Office. He paid no rental fee, being entitled to what is known as the "Group E" rate because free mail delivery service was not provided to him at his residence. (Petition; Reddig Declaration).

2. In March 2001, Postmaster Reddig determined that the current regulation governing post office box service no longer entitled Petitioner, and others similarly situated, to free box service. The postmaster notified these customers that they would have to pay a rental fee to keep their post office boxes. Petitioner paid the fee under protest and filed this Petition to challenge the postmaster's decision. (Petition; Reddig Declaration).

3. Section D910.5.2, the provision of the Domestic Mail Manual (DMM), Issue 56 (January 7, 2001) that is applicable states as follows:

1. The physical address or business location is within the geographic delivery ZIP code boundaries administered by a post office.
2. The physical address or business location constitutes a potential carrier delivery point of service.
3. The USPS chooses not to provide carrier delivery to the physical address or business location.
4. The customer does not receive carrier delivery via an out-of-bounds delivery receptacle.

4. It is not disputed that Petitioner meets criteria a, b, and c. The delivery service that the Apple Valley Post Office has made available to him is at what is called a "cluster" of mailboxes on the rural delivery route for his Zip Code. The specific location is approximately three miles from Petitioner's residence. (Petition; Reddig Declaration).

5. The Postal Operations Manual (POM Issue 8, July 16, 1998) contains the following provision for "Out-of Bounds Customers" in §642.3:

A grant of summary judgment is proper when there are no issues of material fact in dispute and when, as a matter of law, the moving party is entitled to judgment. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-24 (1986); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986). In this case, the only facts disputed by Petitioner involve procedural matters that are not material. Summary judgment is appropriate.

The only issue to be resolved in this case is whether Petitioner is able to "receive carrier delivery via an out-of-bounds delivery receptacle," the final criterion (d) of the rule set forth in DMM §D910.5.2 (Finding of Fact #3).

Respondent's position, based on the declaration of the postmaster, is that the cluster of mailboxes, which Petitioner may join by erecting a box at the designated location, is an appropriate delivery service to customers on the rural delivery route nearest to Petitioner. Therefore, Respondent argues Petitioner is not entitled to a free post office box because free delivery service is provided to him. Respondent also argues that the reasonableness of the postmaster's decision is supported by the fact that other customers similarly situated have not "filed a lawsuit because of the change." This latter argument is only minimally persuasive, as it is not known how many other such customers there are, or whether others may have protested less formally than Mr. DeVos.

Petitioner asserts that the mailbox cluster is in an "isolated insecure location, remote from my own residence by approximately three miles," and that it is near a wash that sometimes floods and could restrict access. He contends that this is not what is meant by the term, "out-of-bounds delivery receptacle," and that the term implies a "secure lockable mail receptacle."

I find no support for Petitioner's argument that a "lockable" mail receptacle is required. The fact that the cluster is some distance from Petitioner's residence does make it somewhat inconvenient and perhaps the location is not as secure as one might like. Those are subjective determinations, however, and it is not the role of this office to second-guess postmasters on matters of geography and terrain. In the absence of facts that demonstrate a postmaster's judgment on a matter of this nature to be patently unreasonable, his interpretation of the applicable rules and his decision are entitled to some deference. Thomas Jefferson University v. Shalala, 512 U.S. 504, 512 (1994); Ludewig v. Wolff, 492 F. Supp. 1048 (S.D. Tex. 1980); Egger v. United States Postal Service, 436 F. Supp. 138 (W.D. Va. 1977); Grover City v. United States Postal Service, 391 F. Supp. 982 (C.D. Cal. 1975).

The postmaster's decision to change Petitioner's post office box service from the free Group E rate to a fee-paid rate is upheld. The Petition is denied.