June 26, 2000 In the Matter of the Petition by KASANDRA A. RAMSEY 5900 Greenville Georgetown Rd. at Greenville, IN 47124-9309 P.S Docket No. DCA 00-113 APPEARANCE FOR PETITIONER: Charles Scialla Scialla Associates, Inc. 453 Preakness Avenue, #5 Paterson, NJ 07502-1121 APPEARANCE FOR RESPONDENT: Mera E. Cole-Hayden Labor Relations Specialist United States Postal Service 320 Whittington Parkway, Suite 302 Louisville, KY 40222-7972
FINAL DECISION UNDER THE DEBT COLLECTION ACT OF 1982
Petitioner, Kasandra Ramsey, filed a timely Petition for a hearing under the Debt Collection Act, 5 U.S.C. §5514(a), after receiving a Notice of Involuntary Administrative Salary Offsets on March 17, 2000. This Notice stated the Postal Service's intention to withhold $5,791.74 from her salary to recover an overpayment of salary between April 1997 and November 1999.
A hearing was held in Louisville, Kentucky on May 23, 2000.(1) The Postal Service presented testimony from Barbara Brown, Petitioner's supervisor, who issued the Notice of Involuntary Administrative Salary Offsets, Paula Howard, a finance supervisor, and Ronald Langevin, District Manager of Finance. Petitioner testified in her own behalf, and also presented testimony from Jack Barnett, an employee who had formerly received night differential pay, Debra Harlow, an expedited service specialist, and Richard Hare, Petitioner's former supervisor. Both parties also relied on documents that had been filed with the Petition and the Answer. Each side presented two additional documents at the hearing. The following findings of fact are based on the entire record, including observation of the witnesses and their demeanor.
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. Petitioner is the manager of transportation networks for what is called the Kentuckiana District. She has held that position since 1992. (Tr. 120-23).(2)
2. Duty hours that fall between 6 a.m. and 6 p.m. are known as Tour 2. Early morning hours are called Tour 1 and late evening hours are called Tour 3. Petitioner's position as transportation manager is coded in the personnel and finance system as Tour 2. In order to accomplish her job, she often works some evening or early morning hours. (Tr. 33-34, 40, 47, 120-21, 128; Answer, Exs. 3 and 4).
3. From February through April 1997, Petitioner was detailed to a position called Manager of Distribution Operations (MDO). While performing this job, Petitioner worked on Tour 3 and she was paid night differential pay. When she returned to her permanent position as transportation manager, however, no adjustment was made to her pay record and she continued to receive 5½ hours per day of night differential pay until Mr. Langevin initiated corrective action in November 1999. (Tr. 35, 61-63, 124-26; Answer, Ex. 5).
4. Petitioner knew she was continuing to receive night differential pay after she returned to her permanent position. (Tr. 58, 124-25).
5. "Night differential" is a form of premium pay that is paid to eligible employees who work between 6 p.m. and 6 a.m. as part or all of their normal schedule. The applicable rules are found in PS Handbook F-21, Time and Attendance, §241, and in the Employee and Labor Relations Manual (ELM), §434.2. (Answer, Ex. 7 and Ex. 8; PS Ex. 1 and Ex. 2). "Night differential is not payable when service performed is in addition to the normal service day." ELM §434.223.
6. Petitioner is an employee eligible to receive night differential, and did receive it while on the MDO detail. After she returned to her regular duties in April 1997, she was no longer entitled to receive night differential. For reasons that are not clear, however, the necessary change in the payroll system was not made and she continued to receive night differential until pay period 23 (November) of 1999.
7. When the error was discovered, the night differential pay was stopped, and Petitioner was issued a Letter of Debt Determination on January 5, 2000, to recoup 3,201 hours of night differential pay. She requested reconsideration, which was denied on February 15, 2000, and the Notice of Involuntary Administrative Salary Offsets was issued on March 16, 2000. (Answer, Exs. 1-4).
DECISION
Petitioner does not dispute the fact that her scheduled hours fall between 6 a.m. and 6 p.m., or that she continued to be paid night differential after she returned from the MDO detail to her regular job. Nor does she dispute the number of hours in issue - 3,201. She contends that she was still entitled to the premium pay, however, because she regularly works many hours on Tour 1 and Tour 3 in order to perform her duties properly. She states that she has never had any regularly assigned hours, or days off, and has always worked however long it takes to accomplish her job. She also argues that, when she returned from the MDO detail, her former supervisor, Mr. Hare, told her that he "didn't see any problem" with her continuing to receive night differential pay. Petitioner also cites cases of other employees who were not required to pay back night differential pay even though she believes they were not entitled to receive it.
Respondent's position is simply that administrative errors that result in an overpayment to an employee do not entitle the employee to keep the overpayment. Respondent argues that the rules do not entitle an employee to night differential pay merely because the employee chooses to work extra hours.
There is no question that Petitioner's status changed when her MDO detail ended, and that her regular duty hours after April 1997 did not entitle her to be paid night differential pay. She knew that she had not received night differential pay before the detail began, and she returned to the same position when the detail ended. The fact that she often worked some night hours does not change her entitlement. There appears to be no dispute that Petitioner has been a dedicated, hard-working employee for many years, but the rules cited above (Finding of Fact #5) are clear. As to her claim that her former supervisor "approved" her entitlement to the premium pay, Mr. Hare testified credibly at the hearing and did not support that contention at all.
The fact that postal officials were slow in discovering and correcting the error does not relieve Petitioner of the obligation to pay back an overpayment. The other cases she points to in arguing that management has selectively asserted this debt claim against her are not relevant here. The evidence presented at the hearing as to those cases was either that those individuals requested waivers of their indebtedness and that waivers were granted, or that the cases were not factually similar to Petitioner's. As was made clear to all parties at the hearing, a waiver request is something entirely separate from this proceeding. A Debt Collection Act Hearing Official has no authority to grant a waiver, or to direct any postal official to grant, or deny, a waiver. This decision expresses no opinion as to whether waivers were appropriate in other cases, or whether a waiver would be appropriate in Petitioner's case.
Respondent has shown by a preponderance of evidence that Petitioner was overpaid in the amount alleged, and Petitioner has shown no basis for finding that she is not indebted to the Postal Service. The Petition is denied. Respondent may collect $5,791.74 from Petitioner's salary.
Bruce R. Houston Chief Administrative Law Judge
2 Reference is to the hearing transcript. References to the tabbed exhibits attached to Respondent's Answer will be Answer, Ex. _. References to documents introduced at the hearing will be PS Ex. _, or Pet. Ex. _.