In the Matter of the Petition by	)   February 25, 1999
					)
REGINA HILL				)
4117 Michigan Drive, Apt. D		)
Silverdale, WA  98315-9434		)
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					)
					)
					)
Notice of Determination to Refuse or	)
Terminate Mail Service for P.O. Box 214,)
Milwaukee, WI 53201-0214		)   P.S. Docket No. POB 99-22

APPEARANCE FOR PETITIONER:		Regina Hill
					4117 Michigan Drive, Apt. D
					Silverdale, WA  98315-9434

APPEARANCE FOR RESPONDENT:		Janessa L. Grady, Esq.
					Civil Practice Section
					United States Postal Service
					475 L’Enfant Plaza, SW, Room 6333
					Washington, D.C. 20260-1127

This proceeding arises out of a Petition filed by Ms. Hill after receiving a letter, dated December 22, 1998, informing her that Post Office Box 214 was to be closed because the postmaster had determined that she was using the box primarily to have mail forwarded to other addresses free of charge. On January 29, 1999, Respondent, United States Postal Service, filed a Motion for Summary Judgment, arguing that there were no issues of material fact in dispute and that Respondent was entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

I have considered Respondent’s Motion for Summary Judgment and Petitioner’s response thereto. While there are some minor differences in the facts asserted by the parties, I find that there are no material facts in dispute and that decision on the motion is appropriate. The following findings of fact are based on all the materials submitted by both parties.

1. Petitioner owns a home and operates one or more businesses in Milwaukee, Wisconsin. For some time, at least as early as 1997, she has rented Post Office Box 214 in Milwaukee.

2. Petitioner is engaged to an active duty member of the United States Navy.

3. In September 1997, Ms. Hill’s fiancé was stationed in Groton, Connecticut, and Ms. Hill joined him there. She submitted a change-of-address order to have her mail forwarded from Box 214 until August 1998. Her mail was forwarded in accordance with this request. She returned to Milwaukee on August 15, 1998 and remained there until September 7, 1998, when she followed her fiancé to his new assignment in Washington State. She stopped the mail forwarding while she was in Milwaukee, and picked up her mail from the box.

4. In September 1998, Petitioner requested that her mail be forwarded to an address in Silverdale, Washington. The Milwaukee Post Office denied the request and, after some correspondence between Petitioner and postal officials, the December 22, 1998 letter from Kenneth Plummer, Customer Relations Coordinator, informed her that a determination had been made that the box was being used primarily for mail forwarding.

5. Domestic Mail Manual (DMM), Section F020, deals with forwarding of mail. §F020.1.3 states:

6. Domestic Mail Manual (DMM), Section D910, deals with post office box service. §D910.3.7 states:

7. DMM §D910.8.2 gives a postmaster authority to terminate box service if the customer violates any of the rules on use of the box.

A grant of summary judgment is proper when there are no issues of material fact in dispute and when, as a matter of law, the moving party is entitled to judgment. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-24 (1986); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986). The moving party has the burden of establishing the absence of a genuine issue of fact and, if that burden is met, the opposing party must counter with something more than "mere denials or conclusory statements." Mingus Contractors, Inc. v. United States, 812 F.2d 1387, 1390 (Fed. Cir. 1987); see also Adickes v. S.H. Kress Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157-59; Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e).

The dispute in this case is over interpretation and application of Postal Service rules, not over any significant factual questions. Therefore, summary judgment is appropriate.

What Petitioner would like is to maintain her permanent home and mailing address in Milwaukee, but accompany her fiancé/husband to the locations of his military assignments when possible and have her mail forwarded to those locations. Her apparent intention is to return to Milwaukee periodically, including times when her fiancé/husband is at sea, to maintain her business. During these periods she would stop the mail forwarding, and pick up the mail at her post office box. This plan may not seem unreasonable, but it does run afoul of postal regulations.

Petitioner argues that because she remains a Wisconsin resident, she has a right to maintain a post office box there. That is not so. Post office box service is not something any customer has a "right" to. It is a service offered to customers who are willing to comply with the rules and regulations pertaining to the use of post office boxes. R.C. Tanner, P.S. Docket No. POB 98-67 (P.S.D. May 15, 1998); Michael H. Briggs, P.S. Docket No. POB 96-428 (P.S.D. February 24, 1997); William H. Lahan, P.S. Docket No. 24/156 (P.S.D. December 31, 1986); Anthony E. DiBari, P.S. Docket No. 20/21 (P.S.D. January 24, 1985). The Postal Service has the right to establish reasonable requirements and rules for the use of post office boxes. Michael D. Tomsyck, P.S. Docket No. POB 98-168 (P.S.D. September 22, 1998).

Petitioner also argues that she has a right to have mail forwarded during any period, as long as no single period exceeds one year. This argument focuses only on §F020.1.3, which deals generally with mail forwarding, but it overlooks §D910.3.7, which deals specifically with post office boxes. The sole determinant in this case is the phrase "primary purpose." This is a somewhat subjective standard, but the postmaster’s application of it to the facts of this case is reasonable. Since September 1997, except for approximately three weeks in August/September 1998, Petitioner has asked to have mail forwarded from Box 214 to addresses in Connecticut and Washington. In addition, Petitioner has stated her desire to continue to have mail forwarded as long as her fiancé is in the Navy, except when he is at sea. It is reasonable to conclude, therefore, that the "primary purpose" of the post office box has become to serve as a base for mail forwarding.

A third argument that Petitioner makes should also be noted. She argues that she has a right to keep the box, and have a friend or relative pick up the mail and send it to her at her own expense. This is correct, and would perhaps provide a basis for settling this dispute. If she chose to do this, there would be no request to the post office to have her mail forwarded, and the rule in §D910.3.7 would be irrelevant. On the facts as they exist, however, Petitioner is using P.O. Box 214 primarily for mail forwarding, and this is contrary to the rule in DMM §D910.3.7. Accordingly, the postmaster’s determination to close Petitioner’s post office box is sustained, and Respondent’s Motion for Summary Judgment is granted.

				Bruce R. Houston
				Chief Administrative Law Judge