In the Matter of the Petition by ) April 16, 1998 ) CYRUS CARDAN a/k/a ) CYRUS AZAMI ) P.O. Box 335 ) Santa Monica, CA 90406-0335 ) ) ) ) Termination of Post Office Box ) Service for P.O. Box 335 at ) Santa Monica, CA ) P.S. Docket No. POB 98-37 APPEARANCE FOR PETITIONER: Cyrus Cardan P. O. Box 335 Santa Monica, CA 90406-0335 APPEARANCE FOR RESPONDENT: Christine M. Taylor, Esq. Consumer Protection Law United States Postal Service 475 L'Enfant Plaza, SW Washington, DC 20260-1127
This proceeding arises out of a Petition filed by Mr. Cardan after he was informed on or about September 5, 1997 that his post office box had been closed because he failed to pay the annual fee that had been due on July 31, 1997. His Petition was filed in this office on January 26, 1998.(1) On February 5, 1998, Respondent, United States Postal Service, filed its Answer along with a Motion for Summary Judgment arguing that there were no factual issues in dispute and that Respondent was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. After receiving extensions of time for submitting a reply, Petitioner has now replied to the motion. He agrees that the material facts are not in dispute, but as he argues that he is entitled to prevail, his reply is also a Cross Motion for Summary Judgment. The following findings of fact are based on all the materials submitted by Petitioner.
1. Petitioner, Mr. Cardan, rented Post Office Box 335 in July 1994. (PS Form 1091-A, attached to Petition). The rental fee is due every six months, in advance. (53 Domestic Mail Manual ((DMM)) §D910.4.5). The fee pertinent to this case was due on July 31, 1997.
2. On August 29, 1997, Petitioner appeared at the Santa Monica Post Office to claim his mail, but was told by a clerk that his box had been closed because he had not paid the fee. Petitioner attempted to pay the fee at that time, but was told by the clerk that he should return on September 2, 1997 and speak to someone with more authority. Petitioner returned on September 5, 1997, and was told by a supervisor that his box was closed.
3. Thereafter, Petitioner continued to protest and inquire about how to make payment and get his box back. On September 9, 1997, he was called by another supervisor and told that he would have to file a new application and provide a verifiable address. Petitioner declined to provide an address, claiming that this requirement violated his right to privacy. The supervisor declined to accept Petitioner's check and denied his request that he be allowed to keep the box while that issue was resolved.
This case needs to be discussed as two separate events. The first was the closing of Petitioner's box sometime between August 29 and September 5, 1997. The second was Petitioner's declination to submit a new application for a post office box, in protest over what he apparently perceives as an invasion of his privacy.
Box Closing
53 DMM §D910 contains the rules and regulations covering post office box service. §D910.4.5 - Payment - states, "All fees are for a semiannual (6-month) period, and must be paid in advance for no less than one but no more than two semiannual periods, . . .." §D910.8.4 - Surrendered Box - states, in pertinent part, "A post office box is deemed surrendered if the box customer . . . fails to pay the appropriate fees by the due date, . . .."
39 C.F.R. Part 958, granting a customer the right to petition for review in the Judicial Officer Department, applies to cases in which a postmaster has issued a formal determination denying an application for a post office box, or terminating post office box service. A determination, in the form of a letter, is required only when service is denied or terminated for one of the reasons stated in the Domestic Mail Manual §§D910.8.1 or D910.8.2. These reasons include abuse of the box, use of the box for unlawful purposes, submitting false information in renting the box, or otherwise violating postal regulations involving a post office box. A postmaster does not issue a determination when a box is surrendered, intentionally or otherwise. Therefore, questions concerning surrender of a post office box are not appealable to an Administrative Law Judge or the Judicial Officer, nor is there any authority to direct the return of a post office box to a former boxholder after it has been rented to another customer. William Kuntz, III, P.S. Docket No. 40/55 (P.S.D. April 26, 1993); Property Exchange & Sales, Inc., P.S. Docket No. 37/120 (P.S.D. Sept. 12, 1991).
Consequently, Petitioner's procedural arguments about the postmaster's failure to issue a determination letter are off the mark, as there was no requirement to do so.
Re-application
Because Petitioner chose not to reapply for box service, there was no denial of service and again no requirement for the postmaster to issue a determination letter. Therefore, there is no appealable issue here. Suffice it to say, however, that Petitioner's arguments based on a constitutional right to privacy that entitles him to withhold a residence address from a post office box application are without merit. Post office box service is not something any customer has a "right" to. It is a service offered to customers who are willing to comply with the rules and regulations pertaining to the use of post office boxes. Michael H. Briggs, P.S. Docket No. POB 96-428 (P.S.D. February 24, 1997); William H. Lahan, P.S. Docket No. 24/156 (P.S.D. December 31, 1986); Anthony E. DiBari, P.S. Docket No. 20/21 (P.S.D.
January 24, 1985). One of those rules, found in DMM §D910.2.4, is that an applicant "identify his or her physical address."
A grant of summary judgment is proper when there are no issues of material fact in dispute and when, as a matter of law, the moving party is entitled to judgment. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-24 (1986); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986). The moving party has the burden of establishing the absence of a genuine issue of fact and, if that burden is met, the opposing party must counter with something more than "mere denials or conclusory statements." Mingus Contractors, Inc. v. United States, 812 F.2d 1387, 1390 (Fed. Cir. 1987); see also Adickes v. S.H. Kress Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157-59; Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). In this case, the parties agree that there are no material facts in dispute. Therefore, summary judgment is appropriate.
Respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment is granted, Petitioner's Cross Motion for Summary Judgment is denied, and the Petition is dismissed.
Bruce R. Houston Chief Administrative Law Judge