In the Matter of the Petition by ) August 6, 1997 ) STANLEY J. WOOD ) 1200 Main Place Tower ) ) at ) ) Buffalo, NY 14202-3796 ) P.S. Docket No. DCA 97-132 APPEARANCE FOR PETITIONER: Stanley J. Wood 1200 Main Place Tower Buffalo, NY 14202-3796 APPEARANCES FOR RESPONDENT: James J. Puchala, Esq. U.S. Postal Inspection Service P.O. Box 3000 Bala Cynwyd, PA 19004-3609 Thomas V. Sottile, Esq. U.S. Postal Inspection Service P.O. Box 3000 Bala Cynwyd, PA 19004-3609
Petitioner, Stanley J. Wood, a postal inspector, filed this Petition on April 16, 1997, after receiving a Notice of Involuntary Administrative Salary Offsets, dated April 3, 1997, from Vivian Bellinger, Manager of Human Resources for the Postal Inspection Service. The Notice stated the Postal Service's intention to withhold $2,004.50 from Petitioner's salary to recoup the salary paid to him for the period April 1-10, 1996, a period the Postal Service has declared him to have been in a leave without pay (LWOP) status.
A hearing was held in Washington, DC, on June 19, 1997. Respondent, the Postal Service, presented testimony from James K. Belz, Deputy Chief Postal Inspector for Administration, and Ms. Bellinger. Mr. Wood testified in his own behalf, and both sides presented documentary evidence. Respondent's counsel made an oral summation prior to the close of the hearing, and both parties submitted written arguments after receiving a transcript of the hearing. The following findings of fact are based on the entire record, including observation of the witnesses and their demeanor.(1)
1. Petitioner was formerly assigned to the Cleveland, Ohio, Division of the Postal Inspection Service. In February 1995, Petitioner's supervisor proposed to remove him from the Postal Inspection Service, based on six charges of improper conduct, involving falsification of records and misuse of government property. Petitioner contested these charges, and he was placed on administrative leave (with pay) while the case was reviewed by Postal Service officials.
2. On March 25, 1996, Inspector Belz issued the Postal Service decision on the alleged misconduct. (Rx-1).(2) He found that the facts supported five of the six charges but that, considering all the circumstances, removal was not warranted.
He directed that Inspector Wood be reduced in grade, that he serve a 30-day suspension without pay, and that he be transferred from the Cleveland Division to Buffalo, New York. Inspector Belz's March 25, 1996, decision letter stated:
The effective date of the reduction in grade will be March 30, 1996. You are to commence your advance round trip on April 1, 1996, to your duty station for a period not to exceed 10 days. The suspension of 30 days will commence on April 11, 1996, and extend through May 10, 1996. The effective date of your reassignment to the Buffalo Division is May 11, 1996. You are to report to Division Headquarters on May 13, 1996.
3. An advance round trip is authorized for an employee, and family, when an employee is transferred, for the purpose of finding permanent housing at the new duty location. (Tr. 20, 46; Handbook F-12, Postal Service Relocation Policy, Chapter 3).(3)
4. On March 29, 1996, after Petitioner received the decision letter and consulted his attorney, the attorney, Mr. Belkin, sent a letter by telefax to Mr. Puchala, attorney for the Postal Inspection Service. This letter argued that the two days' notice for Inspector Wood to take the advance round trip was unreasonable, and asked that "the provisions of Inspector Belz's decision relating to the mechanics of the transfer be revised." He asked that the transfer to Buffalo be effective August 1, 1996. (Answer, Ex. 4; Petitioner Ex. 5).
5. Mr. Puchala responded, also by telefax on March 29, 1996. He acknowledged Mr. Belkin's complaints, and stated that he would review "any specific procedural defects" if Mr. Belkin would identify them. He also noted that, "an Inspector is generally given 60 days to report to a new duty station. If Inspector Wood must have 60 days to report, he will be permitted to use annual leave to extend his reporting date to June 1, 1996. However, his effective date will remain May 11, 1996." Further, he stated that Inspector Wood could split the advance round trip, taking one on April 1 and the other after the 30-day suspension. (Answer, Ex. 5).
6. Mr. Belkin telefaxed another letter to Mr. Puchala on April 3, 1996. He asked that Inspector Wood be sent a copy of the relocation handbook and other materials normally provided to one being transferred. He also suggested that Inspector Wood's starting date be moved back, and that he be "detailed" to the Buffalo office before that date. Finally, he asked that Inspector Wood be given access to his office in Cleveland, and that he be given the name and telephone number of his superior in the Buffalo office. (Answer, Ex. 6; Petitioner Ex. 6).
7. Mr. Puchala replied, again by telefax, on April 4, 1996. He stated that the requested materials had been sent by Express Mail to Inspector Wood, and provided the information about the Buffalo office. He also repeated his earlier statements that Inspector Wood could make two advance round trips, and that Inspector Wood could take annual leave. He stated that a detail to Buffalo would not be approved, and that the period of suspension would still begin on April 11, 1996. Finally, he stated that Inspector Wood was then considered to be in a leave without pay status as of April 1, because he had not begun to travel and had not advised anyone that he did not intend to take the advance round trip. (Answer, Ex. 7; Petitioner Ex. 7).
8. If Petitioner had made it known that he opted not to take the trip or request leave, Inspector Belz would have moved up the starting date of the 30-day suspension and the Buffalo reporting date. Inspector Wood did not have the option of reporting back to work at the Cleveland office during the interim. Also, Inspector Belz did not have authority to simply charge Inspector Wood with annual leave for this period. (Tr. 94-95).
9. Petitioner did not take the advance round trip and did not request annual leave for any part of the April 1-10 period, but did report to the Buffalo Division on Monday, May 13, 1996, as Inspector Belz had directed. (Tr. 171-72; Rx-6 (Stipulation of Parties), ¶¶5 and 6).
10. On April 17, 1996, Petitioner appealed Inspector Belz's March 25, 1996, decision on the misconduct charges to the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB). On or about June 20, 1996, Petitioner received an invoice from the Postal Service Finance Center stating that he owed $2,004.50 for overpayment during the period April 1-10, 1996. (Supp. to Answer, Ex. 3; Petitioner Ex. 33). On July 16, 1996,
Ms. Bellinger sent Petitioner a letter of demand concerning this alleged debt. (Petitioner Ex. 36). For a period of months thereafter, Petitioner and Ms. Bellinger's office exchanged correspondence concerning the alleged debt and Petitioner's requests for reconsideration. (Petitioner Exs. 39-44).
11. On November 7, 1996, Ms. Bellinger denied Petitioner's last request for reconsideration, but stated that no action to collect the debt would be taken until the MSPB decided the appeal. (Answer, Ex. 6b; Petitioner Ex. 48).
12. The MSPB affirmed Inspector Belz's decision on March 11, 1997. (Answer, Ex. 2).(4) Ms. Bellinger issued a Notice of Involuntary Administrative Salary Offsets on April 3, 1997 (Answer, Ex. 6a; Petitioner Ex. 1), and Inspector Wood filed the Petition.
Contentions of the Parties
Inspector Wood's position is that he was still in an administrative leave status between April 1 and April 10, 1996, because Inspector Belz's March 25 decision letter did not specifically state that the administrative leave was terminated, because the terms given by Inspector Belz for taking the advance round trip were unreasonable, and because Petitioner and his attorney were actively negotiating with the Postal Service representative over the terms of the transfer to Buffalo.
Petitioner makes a number of arguments about the Postal Service's failure to follow normal administrative procedures in transferring an employee. These include failure to send him a relocation package; failure to issue a Form 178, which is normally a prerequisite to travel; and failure to provide information about reimbursement for travel. These issues, plus the argument that it was simply unreasonable to expect him to make this trip on two days' notice, are raised to make the point that he could not travel until these matters were worked out, and that it was reasonable for him to assume that his status (administrative leave) had not changed. Petitioner argues that he never "refused" to take the advance round trip, but that during the disputed time, April 1-10, he was attempting to negotiate the terms of how and when to make the trip.(5)
Respondent's position is that Petitioner's administrative leave status ended on the effective date of Inspector Belz's decision letter, March 30, 1996. That date was stated as the effective date of Petitioner's reduction in grade.(6) Respondent argues that, even though the letter did not specifically state that administrative leave was ended, the letter clearly conveyed that message. That being the case, Respondent argues that it was incumbent upon Petitioner to either take the trip, request annual leave, or inform Inspector Belz that he did not wish to take the advance round trip. Because Petitioner did none of these, Respondent's position is that the only appropriate status for Petitioner during the period April 1-10, 1996, is leave without pay (LWOP).
Respondent's position is that Petitioner, a Postal Service employee for 22 years, with many years' experience as a supervisory law enforcement officer, understood what he was being directed to do by Inspector Belz, and also knew that Inspector Belz's decision letter gave him all the authority he needed to travel to Buffalo. Respondent argues that Petitioner surely knew the March 25 decision returned him to a duty status, and that he could not reasonably have believed he could unilaterally extend his administrative leave status by fighting the terms of the transfer to Buffalo.
The issue to be decided here is whether Petitioner was on notice, as of
April 1, 1996, that his administrative leave status was ended and that he was back in a duty status. If he was on notice, then he had to have known that he could legitimately only be (1) in travel status, (2) on approved leave, or (3) present for work. As it is clear that the last was not an option, Petitioner would have had only two choices.
Whether the Postal Service provided all procedural information to Petitioner as clearly, or as quickly, as they might have is not the issue. Petitioner's argument that it was "not possible" for him to travel because he did not have a Form 178, or because Inspector Belz's letter did not provide information on reimbursement, or because his Postal Service American Express card was left in his Cleveland office, is not persuasive. None of the objections expressed in Mr. Belkin's two letters to
Mr. Puchala (March 29 and April 3) conveyed the idea that Inspector Wood did not believe he had sufficient authorization to travel.
Nor is it for me to determine whether the Postal Service should have "detailed" Petitioner to Buffalo in advance of his reporting date, or whether the usefulness, to Petitioner, of an advance round trip was negated by having such a short time to prepare for it. Whether it was "reasonable" to expect Petitioner to take the advance round trip on such short notice may be in the eye of the beholder, but I have no doubt that the reporting schedule specified by Inspector Belz was a lawful means of carrying out his objective; i.e., to return Inspector Wood to productive work as soon as possible. Even Petitioner seems to acknowledge that Inspector Belz could have ordered the 30-day suspension to begin immediately, and for Petitioner to travel at the end of 30 days. (Tr. 52). We return, then, to the question of whether Petitioner was on notice that he was returned to duty status.
I find that the March 25, 1996, letter, combined with the March 29, 1996, exchange of correspondence between Mr. Belkin and Mr. Puchala, made it clear that Petitioner was returned to a duty status and could no longer reasonably believe he was still on administrative leave. First, the sole purpose of his being on administrative leave was for Postal Service officials to review the charges against him and make a decision as to what action, if any, should be taken. Inspector Belz's March 25, 1996, letter announced that decision, and clearly stated the effective dates of demotion, suspension, and reporting date to new assignment. Even though the letter did not spell out that the period of administrative leave was ended, there could be no reason for it to continue. Any doubt in Petitioner's mind should have been removed by Mr. Puchala's March 29 response to Mr. Belkin's March 29 letter (FOF ¶5). That letter told Petitioner that the effective date of his transfer would not be postponed, but that he could use annual leave if he needed more time to report. Petitioner's testimony that Mr. Belkin told him on April 1 that he should still consider himself on administrative leave is not credible. (Tr. 146). The declaration submitted by Mr. Belkin (Petitioner Ex. 56) does not support this, Petitioner had never made this assertion in any of his letters or statements prior to the hearing, and he equivocated somewhat when questioned further about it at the hearing. (Tr. 146-47).(7)
Even if Petitioner had some honest disagreement with the reasonableness of the timing for his advance round trip, the Postal Service made it sufficiently clear to him that his return to duty status was not going to be postponed. Petitioner could not reasonably have believed that his continuing to argue over the terms of his transfer to Buffalo, or the timing of his advance round trip, could have the effect of keeping him in an administrative leave status. Nor could he have reasonably believed that his attempts, between April 1 and April 10 to negotiate better terms, constituted being back "at work," as a substitute for taking the advance round trip. As of April 1, 1996, Petitioner had to know that he was no longer on administrative leave. Therefore, he was obligated to take the advance trip that had been authorized, inform his superiors that he opted not to take the trip, or request that he be placed on annual leave.
The Petition is denied. Respondent may collect $2,004.50 from Petitioner's
salary.
Bruce R. Houston Chief Administrative Law Judge
2. The case file contains multiple copies of many of the pertinent documents. Rx-1, above, identifies a document introduced separately by Respondent at the hearing. This same document is in the case file as Exhibit 1 (Ex. 1) to Respondent's Answer. Other documents will be identified according to where they may be found in the file.
3. References to the transcript of the hearing are "Tr. _." Excerpts from Handbook F-12 are in the record as Exhibit 14 to Respondent's Answer, and also as Exhibits 2 and 3 submitted by Petitioner.
4. Inspector Wood's appeal to the MSPB, and the MSPB decision, dealt with the misconduct charges and Inspector Belz's findings in regard to them. The appeal did not address the LWOP issue that is the subject of this Debt Collection Act case.
5. It should be noted that there are several references, by both parties, to Petitioner failing to obey Inspector Belz's "order" to take the advance round trip. The Postal Service recognized early on, however, that an employee cannot be required to take this trip - it is a benefit offered to the employee. It is clear, therefore, that the Postal Service declared Petitioner to be in a leave without pay status because he was neither at work, on leave, or on authorized travel - not because he disobeyed an order.
6. April 1, 1996, the date Petitioner was to begin his advance round trip, was a Monday.
7. Even if Mr. Belkin did tell him this, it would not relieve Petitioner from liability. Such advice would have been erroneous and could not override the Postal Service action in effectively returning Petitioner to duty status.