In the Matter of the Complaint Against: NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF BANKCARD HOLDERS, INC., P.O. Box 971-C at Claymont, DE 19703-0971 P.S. Docket No. 33/163 05/19/89 Cohen, James A., Judicial Officer APPEARANCES FOR COMPLAINANT: Jerry Belenker, Esq., Timothy J. Mahoney, Esq., Consumer Protection Division, Law Department, United States Postal Service, Washington, DC 20260-1144 APPEARANCE FOR RESPONDENT: Michael M. Rosenbaum, Esq., Budd Larner Gross Picillo, Rosenbaum Greenberg & Sade, 150 John F. Kennedy Parkway, CN 1000, Short Hills, NJ 07078-0999
By Order dated May 8, 1989, this matter was referred to the Judicial Officer for appropriate action based on the findings of the presiding Administrative Law Judge that Respondent had not filed an Answer to the Complaint within the time prescribed by the Rules of Practice and, therefore, was in default. On May 10, 1989, an Order was issued by the Judicial Officer in which he found Respondent in default. Accompanying the Order were the Cease and Desist Order and False Representation Order sought in the Complaint and authorized by 39 U.S.C. § 3005.
On May 17, 1989, the parties, represented by Jerry Belenker, Esq. for Complainant and Michael M. Rosenbaum, Esq. for Respondent, initiated a telephone conference with the Judicial Officer to discuss the default order. Respondent requested that the default be set aside. Both parties presented arguments on this issue. The arguments of the parties have been fully considered.
Respondent argues that the default order should be set aside because it has a meritorious defense to the allegations of the Complaint, the Complaint was served on Respondent at an address which does not belong to Respondent, the Answer was filed only four days late and before the motion for default was filed, and Respondent was not given an opportunity to be heard on the issue of default and, therefore, was deprived of its due process rights.
Complainant opposes Respondent's request to set aside the default order because Respondent has not shown that service of the Complaint was improper, that its failure to file the Answer was excusable, or that it has a meritorious defense to the allegations of the Complaint.
The facts relative to service of the Complaint are recited in the Administrative Law Judge's Order and will not be repeated here. The facts found by the Administrative Law Judge are supported by the record. See National Ass'n of Bankcard Holders, Inc., P.S. Docket No. 33/163 (J.O. Order May 10, 1989).
The Administrative Law Judge correctly found that the Complaint was properly served on Respondent in accordance with the requirements of 39 C.F.R. § 952.5, .8(a), and that Respondent was in default. Furthermore, Respondent has shown no excusable cause for its failure to either file a timely Answer or request an extension of time for filing an Answer. In the absence of such a showing, the mere allegation of a meritorious defense does not serve to excuse the failure to file a timely Answer. Robinson v. Bantam Books, Inc., 49 F.R.D. 139, 140-41 (S.D.N.Y. 1970); Nelson v. Coleman Co., 41 F.R.D. 7, 9-10 (D.S.C. 1966); YPD of Illinois, P.S. Docket No. 31/28 at 5-6 (P.S.D. Nov. 18, 1988); Sheldon Lewenfus, P.S. Docket No. 30/159 at 6 (P.S.D. Sept. 30, 1988); Ritz, Div. of MVCO, Inc., P.S. Docket No. 12/174 at 2 (P.S.D. Jan. 26, 1982).
In addition, the fact that the Answer was "only" four days late and filed before Complainant's Motion for default was filed does not relieve Respondent from the consequences of its default. See Michael J. Christopher, P.S. Docket No. 23/80 (J.O. Order March 18, 1986) (purported answer two days late); Ritz, Div. of MVCO, Inc., P.S. Docket No. 12/174 (P.S.D. Jan. 26, 1982) (answer seven days late with no motion for default); Commercial Indus. Supply Co., P.S. Docket No. 11/165 (P.S.D. Sept. 28, 1981) (answer six days late); Ferndale Nurseries, P.S. Docket No. 9/31 (P.S.D. Oct. 6, 1980) (answer three days late). Respondent was in default when the fifteen day period for filing the Answer expired, at which time the Orders sought in the Complaint could be issued pursuant to 39 C.F.R. § 952.11(a) "without further notice." Thus, it was not improper to issue the default order without providing Respondent with an opportunity to be heard. See ViAids Laboratories, Inc. v. United States Postal Service, 464 F. Supp. 976, 981-82 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
Respondent has not shown that the default should be set aside. Accordingly, Respondent's request to set aside the default is denied.