In the Matter of the Complaint Against MONEYMAKERS, and MONEYMAKERS, INC. P. O. Box 200 at La Grangeville, NY 12540 P.S. Docket No. 16/1; 06/20/83 Duvall, William A. APPEARANCES FOR COMPLAINANT: Sandra C. McFeeley, Esq. Consumer Protection Division Law Department U.S. Postal Service 475 L'Enfant Plaza West, SW Washington, DC 20260-1100 and Brendan J. O'Brien, Esq. Postal Inspector/Attorney Northeast Region U. S. Postal Service 1633 Broadway New York, NY 10097-0100 APPEARANCE FOR RESPONDENT: Herbert Monte Levy, Esq. 18 East 41st Street New York, NY 10017-6222
In a Complaint filed on February 25, 1983, it is alleged that the General Counsel of the U. S. Postal Service (Complainant) has reason to believe that Respondent, doing business under the names 1/ and at the address set forth in the caption hereof, is engaged in conducting a scheme or device for obtaining money or property through the mail by means of false representations in violation of 39 U. S. Code § 3005.
It is alleged that attention is attracted to said scheme by means of direct mail solicitations which are calculated to induce the recipients thereof to remit money or property through the mail. Complainant's Exhibit 1 (Appendix A hereto) is a copy of the upper portion of a recent solicitation used by Respondent which is typical of those just mentioned. (Tr. 59-60)
In paragraph III of the Complaint, it is charged that by means of such materials and others similar thereto, Respondent represents, directly or indirectly, in substance and effect, whether by affirmative statements, omissions, or implications that:
"(a) Payment of a 'registration fee' will allow immediate participation in Respondent's promotion without further substantial financial investment by the homeworker.
"(b) Respondent is offering at-home employment stuffing envelopes with circulars.
"(c) A participant can expect to earn 75c / for each and every envelope he or she is able to stuff.
"(d) Amounts of earnings are primarily determined by whatever amount of time participants wish to devote or can devote to the stuffing of envelopes with circulars.
"(e) Respondent's program will be available for limited time.
"(f) Respondent will provide the envelopes to be used by participants for the stuffing of circulars."
Complainant then, in paragraph IV of the Complaint, charges that the representations set forth in paragraph III are materially false as a matter of fact, and concludes with the request for the issuance of an order against Respondent as provided by 39 U. S. Code 3005(a)(1) and (2).
In its Answer Respondent:
"1. Admits that, as alleged in paragraph I of the complaint, attention is attracted by means of direct mail solicitations which are calculated to induce the recipients thereof to remit money through the mails, but denies a) that this is a scheme or device for obtaining money or property through the mails by means of false representations in violation of 39 U.S.C. § 3005, and b) denies that the advertisement is calculated to induce the readers thereof to remit property through the mails.
"2. Denies that, as alleged in paragraph II of the complaint, Exhibit 1 to the complaint is a copy of a recent solicitation used by Respondent, such solicitation not having been used for approximately the last 2 years, and further denies that any solicitation can be typical of any other solicitation.
"3. Denies each and every allegation in paragraphs III and IV of the complaint."
Respondent then alleges the following as an affirmative defense:
"4. If the statute (39 U.S.C. § 3005) be applied to the advertisement annexed to the complaint or an advertisement which is similar, then the statute is in violation of substantive due process under the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution, and further would violate the right to freedom of speech of the advertiser under the First Amendment to the United States Constitution."
1. Respondent, under the names Moneymakers and Moneymakers, Inc., conducts its business through, and solicits remittances of money through the mails, to Post Office Box 200, LaGrangeville, NY 12540. (CX-5 and CX-14, the portions containing the "ApplicationGuarantee")
2. The general rule with respect to the interpretation of sales literature used in advertising matter sent through the mail is that the statements made therein are to be judged from consideration of the advertisement in its totality and determining the impression that representations contained therein will most probably create in ordinary minds. Donaldson v. Read Magazine, 333 U.S. 178 (1948); Vibra-Brush Corporation v. Schaffer, 152 F. Supp. 461 (S.D.N.Y. 1957); and Borg-Johnson Electronics v. Christenberry, 169 F. Supp. 746 (S.D.N.Y. 1959) Applying this rule, I find that Respondent makes the representations set forth in paragraph III of the Complaint. 2/
(a) Payment of a "registration fee" will allow immediate participation in Respondent's promotion without further substantial financial investment by the homeworker.
"To enter into our program as a charter member of our homeworkers' corps, there is a modest, one-time $37.00 membership and registration charge. This lifetime fee covers our bookkeeping and administrative costs in registering your membership, and opening your account with us. After that, you will never be required to pay us another penny." (App. A)
* * *
"YOU WILL NEVER HAVE TO PAY US ANOTHER FEE] The envelopes you stuff will have the postage already on them, and all your future circulars will be supplied to you FREE for as long as you continue] WE EVEN REIMBURSE YOU FOR THE PARCEL POST COST OF SENDING US THE STUFFED ENVELOPES]" (App. B)
(b) Respondent is offering at-home employment stuffing envelopes with circulars.
"RIGHT NOW]]--As a MONEYMAKERS Independent Home Mailer, YOU can earn BIG MONEY in your own mailing business. This is EASY, PLEASANT work. It consists of securing and stuffing envelopes with our circulars, in the COMFORT and CONVENIENCE of your own home]" (App. A)
* * *
"Start Now]
RIGHT NOW ... As a MONEYMAKERS Independent Home Mailer. YOU can earn BIG MONEY in your own mailing business. This is easy, pleasant work] It consists of inserting our circulars into the envelopes secured through your classified ad insertions in the comfort and convenience of your own home." (App. B)
(c) A participant can expect to earn 75c / for each and every envelope he or she is able to stuff.
"WE WILL PAY YOU 75c /
for EACH ENVELOPE
YOU STUFF and RETURN to us
following our simple instructions." (App. A)
* * *
"WE WILL PAY YOU 75c /
for EACH ENVELOPE
YOU STUFF and MAIL to us
following our simple instructions" (App. B)
(d) Amounts of earnings are primarily determined by whatever amount of time participants wish to devote or can devote to the stuffing of envelopes with circulars.
"YOUR MEMBERSHIP IS GOOD FOR AS LONG AS YOU WISH TO CONTINUE. DAY AFTER DAY, MONTH AFTER MONTH, YEAR AFTER YEAR YOU WILL CONTINUE TO EARN 75c / PER STUFFED ENVELOPE YOUR ADS SECURE RETURNED TO US FOLLOWING OUR INSTRUCTIONS]" (App. A) * * *
"Cash by Mail]
"As we receive your envelopes, we send you your money]
Send us 50, we'll pay you $37.50]
Send us 100, we'll pay you $75.00]
Send us 500, and we'll pay you $375.00,
and so on. You can earn a secure, steady
income for the rest of your life]" (App. B)
(e) Respondent's program will be available for a limited time.
"THERE HAS NEVER BEFORE BEEN AN OFFER LIKE THIS]] THIS OFFER WILL BE AVAILABLE FOR A LIMITED TIME ONLY, AND WILL REVOLUTIONIZE THE HOME-WORKERS INDUSTRY]]" (App. A)
* * *
"Never Before]
"There has never been an offer like this]] This offer may be available for a limited time only, and will revolutionize the Home-Workers Industry]" (App. B)
* * *
"May We Send
YOU a Check?
"There may never again be an offer like this] Don't miss out on this once in a lifetime opportunity]] Detach the application, and mail it in with your registration fee TODAY]]" (App. B)
* * *
"Act Now]]
"To be fair to our independent mailers, there is a limit, both in number and in location to the number of applications we can accept DON'T DELAY]" (App. B)
(f) Respondent will provide the envelopes to be used by participants for the stuffing of circulars.
"YOU WILL NEVER HAVE TO PAY US ANOTHER FEE, NOT EVEN FOR MATERIALS. THE ENVELOPES YOU STUFF WILL HAVE THE POSTAGE ALREADY PAID ON THEM, AND ALL YOUR CIRCULARS WILL BE SUPPLIED TO YOU ABSOLUTELY FREE FOR AS LONG AS YOU WISH TO REMAIN ACTIVE." (App. A)
* * *
"YOU WILL NEVER HAVE TO PAY US ANOTHER FEE] The envelopes you stuff will have the postage already on them, and all your future circulars will be supplied to you FREE for as long as you continue] WE EVEN REIMBURSE YOU FOR THE PARCEL POST COST OF SENDING US THE STUFFED ENVELOPES]" (App. B)
* * *
"Act Now]]
"To be fair to our independent mailers, there is a limit, both in number and in location to the number of applications we can accept DON'T DELAY]
"As soon as we receive your application and fee, we will enter your membership, and send you complete instructions and a starter's kit." (App. B)
3. The business for which persons are asked to pay $37 or $35, depending upon the particular brochure used, in order to be participants is described in CX-20. There are two versions of these instructions, but the differences are confined to minor language changes which do not alter the meaning. (See CX-14B and CX-20) A copy of CX-20 is attached hereto as Appendix C.
4. Only after the prospective homeworker has received his "Homeworker Corps Instructions" (CX-14B or 20) does he realize, for the first time, that the envelopes to be stuffed are to be obtained by the placement of classified advertising at his expense. Respondent's own instructions state that "Costs vary widely, from a few cents per word to several dollars." This involves a substantial financial expenditure and risk on the part of the homeworker. Therefore, while the participant may never again owe Respondent a fee, he will incur expenses and indebtedness to others if he remains active in this enterprise.
(a) The representation that payment of a "registration fee" will allow immediate participation in Respondent's promotion without further substantial financial investment by the homeworker is false.
The average person receiving one of Respondent's circulars (CX-1, 14, 14A and JX-1) would expect Respondent to furnish the envelopes which are to be stuffed by the participant. Moreover, Respondent's circulars create the impression that the homeworker will have to do nothing except stuff envelopes and mail them to
Respondent. Respondent promises large earnings for simple mechanical tasks. It is not until the prospective homeworker receives his "Homeworker Corps Instructions" that he realizes that he must expend time, effort, and additional money for the purchase of classified advertising for the purpose of obtaining envelopes to be stuffed. There is no guarantee as to the number of replies a homeworker will receive in response to the advertisements he places. The person who responds to Respondent's brochure actually is not paid by Respondent for the work he does. Rather, he is asked to go into business for himself--taking all the risks--in exchange for compensation based solely on the number of responses he receives.
(b) The representation that Respondent is offering at-home employment stuffing envelopes with circulars is false.
A fair interpretation of Respondent's brochure would be that the homeworker could expect to be compensated on a piecework basis, at the rate of 75c / for each envelope stuffed. In fact, however, the homeworker's compensation depends in the first instance on the response rate to the classified ad. After deducting all expenses for advertising, the homeworker's net profit, or loss, can be computed.
(c) The representation that a participant can expect to earn 75c / for each and every envelope he or she is able to stuff is false.
After receipt of the Homeworker Corps Instructions, persons who have paid to participate in this business learn that any earnings to be derived from Respondent's promotion will depend primarily on the response rate to the classified advertising for which, also, they have paid.
(d) The representation that amounts of earnings are primarily determined by whatever amount of time participants wish to devote or can devote to the stuffing of envelopes with circulars is false.
Inspector Maxwell, personally, had received complaints from members of the public in connection with the Moneymakers enterprise for a period of approximately two years as of the date of the hearing. (Tr. 56) Thus, his personal acquaintance with the operation of this business extended back to the Spring or Summer of 1981. It is his belief that he had such complaints coming to him as early as 1979, but his file for that period was not available. Thus, the statement represents his best recollection. Furthermore, a review of Respondent's advertising circulars (CX-1, 14 and 14A) demonstrate that Respondent has been promoting essentially the same program since 1981 (CX-14A).
(e) Based upon the facts of record and the exhibited persistence of Respondent in the present type of business, it is found that the representation that Respondent's program will be available for a limited time is false.
The homeworker does not know, and is not advised until after he has received and read the Homeworker Corps Instructions, that the envelopes to be used in this business are to be obtained at the participant's expense by placing classified advertisements, for which the expense may be substantial.
(f) The representation that Respondent will provide the envelopes to be used by participants for the stuffing of circulars is false.
5. Before an order under 39 U. S. Code 3005 may be issued it must be found not only that certain representations have been made about the product, service, or idea being offered for sale, but, also, it must be found that one or more of the challenged representations are material. Lynch v. Blount, 330 F. Supp. 689, 693 (1971), aff'd. 404 U.S. 1007 (1972) It has been said that to be material a misrepresentation "must cause the other party to do other than that which would have been done had the truth been told." Chaachou v. American Central Insurance Co., 241 F.2d 889, 893 (5th Cir. 1957).
(a) The false representations herein found to have been made are material because they are of the type that would cause the readers to decide to become members of the "homeworkers'" or "Home-Workers" corps, actions which they would not be likely to take if a full and fair disclosure had been made.
6. Point I in Respondent's Memorandum After Hearing reads as follows:
"The Complainant Having Stipulated That Only One Advertising Brochure Is Presently In Use, And That It Does Not Object To Said Brochure, The Complaint Herein Should Be Dismissed."
Respondent wanted to establish that JX-1 is the only advertising brochure in evidence that is currently being used by Respondent to solicit and attract persons to participate in the enterprise which is here under consideration. In this effort Respondent said "there is nothing to show when the last mailing of Complainant's Exhibit 1 was made, except that it must have been a number of months ago, and that there is nothing to show that that CX-1 is currently being used by the Respondent." (Tr. 65) The following colloquy immediately ensued: MR LEVY Respondent's counsel : ***
My point is that the only thing that is being used by the Respondent, as we have conceded and stipulated, is Joint Exhibit 1, to which I understand there is no objection on the part of the government.
MS. MCFEELEY Complainant's counsel :
That's correct. *** (Tr. 65-66).
At the time the above remarks were made, and even now, my impression was, and is, that Mr. Levy said, and intended, that the Complainant did not object to the receipt in evidence of JX-1. It was and is my further belief that my interpretation of Mr. Levy's statement is the point with respect to which Miss McFeeley said "That's correct."
Respondent's Counsel now takes the position that what he meant by his remarks at lines 24 and 25 of page 65 and lines 1 and 2 of page 66 was that Complainant did not regard JX-1 as being objectionable under 39 U. S. Code 3005 in either its content or its effect upon the average person who may read the advertisement.
The next 10 pages of the transcript consist primarily (1) of further cross-examination of Complainant's witness by Respondent's Counsel about that later proved to be an unrelated matter, (2) of Respondent's motion to dismiss, and (3) of his supporting statement. Here, Respondent stated, among other things, that "complainant does not contend that Joint Exhibit 1 contains any false representations, at least so far as I understand it. That is the only exhibit which is conceivably in current use, according to the record that has been made in this case by the Complainant." (Tr. 74)
In reply to the above assertion by Respondent's Counsel, Complainant's Counsel said, in pertinent part:
"I would like to correct a statement Mr. Levy made earlier, that he appeared to be under the impression that we don't find anything objectionable to Joint Exhibit 1. That is not so. We offered it in evidence or sought to have it offered in evidence because we do find it objectionable. We find that it makes the representations alleged in the complaint." (Tr. 76-77)
In the first place, it is difficult to understand how Respondent could argue that JX-1 is "the only exhibit which is conceivably in current use." Counsel had just completed crossexamination of Postal Inspector Maxwell, in the course of which this exchange occurred:
"Q by Mr. Levy How do you know CX-1 is now being used by the Respondent?
"A Based on the current complaints we're receiving now." (Tr. 60)
Secondly, with respect to the statement that "Complainant does not contend that Joint Exhibit 1 contains any false representations," Respondent's Counsel, himself, indicated uncertainty when he concluded that statement with the phrase "at least so far as I understand it."
Third, if Complainant had been of the view that JX-1 is unobjectionable, no useful purpose would have been served by actively seeking to obtain its admission into the record.
Finally, the entire atmosphere and context of the situation at the hearing was incompatible and irreconcilable with any idea other than that the Complainant wanted JX-1 in the record as part of its case. So much importance was attached to the exhibit that upon the announcement of the stipulations regarding CX-20, CX-21 and JX-1, Complainant withdrew its Exhibits 15, 16, 16-A, 17, 18 and 19. (Tr. 51-52)
(a) It is found as a fact that Complainant did not stipulate that only one advertising brochure (JX-1) is in use by Respondent, and Complainant did not stipulate that it does not object to the content of that brochure.
(b) Based upon the foregoing considerations, and other matters of record, this case involves Complainant's Exhibits 1 through 14-B, 20, 21 and Joint Exhibit 1. (Tr. Index, and the exhibits and pages therein cited).
7. In concluding its Point II, namely, that JX-1 is the exhibit on which this case is based and that it contains no false representations, Respondent decries the use by Complainant of a standard by "which representations are made by omissions" (Emphasis is Respondent's; pp. 10-14, Respondent's Memorandum).
In the case which for years has been the guiding light in the consideration and determination of cases of this type, the Supreme Court has expressed itself on the same subject - but not to the same effect - as has Respondent. The reference is, of course, to Donaldson v. Read Magazine, 333 U.S. 178, in which at page 188, the Court said:
"Advertisements as a whole may be completely misleading although every sentence separately considered is literally true. This may be BECAUSE THINGS ARE OMITTED THAT SHOULD BE SAID, or because advertisements are composed or purposefully printed in such way as to mislead. Wiser v. Lawler, 189 U.S. 260, 264; Farley v. Simmons, 99 F.2d 343, 346; see also cases collected in 6 Eng. Rul. Cas. 129-131. (Emphasis by capitalization added)
In addition, there are some pertinent excerpts from the recommendation of United States Magistrate Sol Schreiber in Original Cosmetic Products, Inc., et al. v. Strachan, et al., 459 F. Supp. 496 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), aff'd. w/o Op. 603 F.2d 214 (2nd Cir. 1979), cert. den. 444 U.S. 915 (1979), as follows:
"The Court is concerned with the ultimate impression upon the potential consumer 'not only from the total of what is stated but also from what is reasonably implied.' N. Van Dyne Advertising Agency, Inc. v. United States Postal Service, 371 F. Supp. 1373, 1376 (S.D.N.Y. 1974)."
* * *
It is no defense that specific isolated portions of the advertisement might have been true.
'It is not each separate word or a clause here and there of an advertisement which determines its force, but the totality of its contents and the impression of the entire advertisement upon the populace . . .
' E ven if an advertisement is so worded as not to make an express misrepresentation, nevertheless, if it is artfully designed to mislead those responding to it, the mail fraud statutes are applicable.' Borg-Johnson Electronics, Inc. v. Christenberry, 169 F. Supp. 746, 750-51 (S.D.N.Y. 1959)."
* * *
"In the instance of the mail fraud law, if the evidence establishes that the scheme is directed toward the gullible and the simple, the protection of the statute is not to be denied them even though they do not reach the level of the 'ordinary mind.' The purpose of the statute is to protect the unwary and unsuspecting as well as the knowledgeable and worldly-wise--those who are 'trusting as well as the suspicious.' The public includes '"that vast multitude . . . the ignorant, the unthinking and the credulous."' The fact that informed and sophisticated persons would readily recognize, laugh off, or even be amused by, obviously false and absurd statements in an advertisement does not detract from their power to deceive the ignorant, gullible and less experienced. Gottlieb v. Schaffer, 141 F. Supp. 7, 16 (S.D.N.Y. 1956) (footnotes omitted)."
It was said in Rhodes Pharmacal Co. v. Federal Trade Commis sion, 208 F.2d 382, 387 (7th Cir. 1953):
"The important question to be resolved is the impression given by an advertisement as a whole. Advertisements which are capable of two meanings, one of which is false, are misleading ***. Advertisements which create a false impression, although literally true, may be prohibited."
(a) The message that comes through clearly is that if advertisements contain material misrepresentations - resulting either from what is said or from what is not said - they may be prohibited.
8. Point III in Respondent's Memorandum is that -
BY MAILING TO INTRODUCE INTO EVIDENCE THE EXHIBIT ANNEXED TO THE COMPLAINT, AND BY RELYING INSTEAD UPON A DIFFERENT EXHIBIT, COMPLAINANT HAS DEPRIVED RESPONDENT OF PROPERTY WITHOUT THE DUE PROCESS OF LAW REQUIRED BY THE FIFTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION. AND INSOFAR AS THE REMEDY SOUGHT BY THE COMPLAINANT IS AN IMPOUNDING OF MONIES FROM ANY ADVERTISEMENT WHOSE TEXT HAS NOT BEEN ADJUDICATED TO CONTAIN FALSE ADVERTISING, THE COMPLAINANT SEEKS A PRIOR RESTRAINT UPON COMMUNICATION FORBIDDEN BY THE FIRST AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION.
Respondent has been charged with conducting a scheme or device for obtaining money or property through the mail by means of false representations. It is charged that attention is attracted to the scheme by means of direct mail solicitations, a copy of a recent one of which is said to be attached to the Complaint, and that this solicitation is typical of others that have been or are being used. It is further charged that by means of the solicitation attached to the Complaint and by other materials similar thereto, Respondent makes certain material representations which are false.
The thrust of the Complaint is not that Respondent makes, solely, certain material misrepresentations in piece of paper "X". The charge is that Respondent is conducting a "scheme" to obtain money through the mail by means of misrepresentations which are made, or made in substance, in various solicitations, one of which is exemplified by the copy of a solicitation attached to the Complaint.
Apparently, the Complainant knows that schemes have more than one facet and that they are promoted in a variety of ways by the use of various aids. These aids and devices may take different forms, employ different language and involve different techniques. After all, who is better informed as to Respondent's tactics than the Respondent? That one such aid or technique is referred to in the Complaint does not prevent the Complainant from referring to and relying on others during the course of a hearing on the alleged "scheme."
Particularly is the foregoing statement true when it is recognized that the Postal Service has provided the means by which each party, to a substantial degree, may inform itself of the essentials of its adversary's case. The means so provided consist of the Rules of Practice, a copy of which is mailed with every complaint which the Recorder mails to a Respondent. If a Respondent wishes to learn just on what the Complainant intends to rely in its presentation, provision is made in Rule 952.21 for requests for admissions of specified facts (952.21(h)) and applications for the production of documents or objects (952.21(i)). If persons do not take advantage of these provisions of the Rules, the presumption is that they feel they do not wish or need to do so. If parties do not avail themselves of the benefits of the Rules, they can not be heard at the hearing or in their post-hearing submittals to complain of their lack of information.
(a) Point III of Respondent's Memorandum is without merit.
9. Point IV of Respondent's Memorandum is that -
"IF COMPLAINANT'S EXHIBIT 1 BE BEFORE THIS COURT, THEN WE NOTE THAT IT DID NOT CONTAIN ANY FALSE REPRESENTATIONS."
It previously has been determined herein (1) that CX-1 is among the exhibits received in evidence in this case, (F.F. 6. (b), supra, p. 14), (2) that CX-1 contains the material representations set forth in paragraph III of the Complaint (F.F. 2., supra, p. 4); and (3) that the said representations are false (F.F. 4. (a) through (f), supra, pp. 7 through 10).
(a) Point IV of Respondent's Memorandum is without merit.
1. Findings of Fact 2, 4(a) through 4(f), and 5(a) are incorporated here by reference as conclusions of law as fully as if repeated herein verbatim.
2. Respondent's affirmative defense that for the Postal Service to proceed under 39 U. S. Code § 3005 against statements made in Respondent's advertisements renders the statute violative of substantive due process under the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution, and, further, would violate the right to freedom of speech of the advertiser under the First Amendment to the United States Constitution is without merit and it is rejected. (Lynch v. Blount, 330 F. Supp. 689 (1971); Virginia State Board of Pharmacy, et al. v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., et al., 425 U.S. 748 (1976)).
3. It is concluded as a matter of law that the Respondent, in engaging in the operation described in this decision, is engaged in conducting a scheme or device for obtaining money through the mail by means of representations that are false in regard to material matters of fact, as heretofore found, within the meaning of Section 3005 of Title 39, United States Code.
Proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law submitted by the parties in this case have been fully considered. Such proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law have been adopted to the extent herein indicated. Otherwise, such proposals are rejected because they are unsupported by and contrary to the law and the evidence in this case or because of their irrelevance or immateriality.
An order of the type provided by the said 39 U.S. Code 3005 should be issued against this Respondent.
1/ Moneymakers, Inc. was added to the proceeding as a party Respondent at the hearing on motion by Complainant's Counsel. (Tr. 75-77)
2/ The representations are re-stated with underscoring, and language upon which they may be based is copied and quoted from Appendices A and B, which are, respectively, copies of CX-1 and JX-1. Most of the representations are made in more than one statement of the advertisements and some repetition of Respondent's statements appear, but the repetitions are included here only to complete the support for the representation to which they relate.