In the Matter of the Complaint Against

 STARR RETAILERS
 P. O. Box 518
 at Milroy, PA 17063

 P.S. Docket No. 12/42;  

 03/04/82

 Cohen, James A.  

 APPEARANCE FOR COMPLAINANT:
 SandraC. McFeeley,Esq.
 Consumer Protection Division
 Law Department
 United States Postal Service
 Washington, DC 20260

 APPEARANCE FOR RESPONDENT:
 John N. Miller, Esq.
 Thatcher & Miller
 115 West Market Street
 Lewistown, PA 17044

On November 12, 1981, Respondent filed a Motion to Set Aside an Order of Default and the accompanying False Representation Order, Order No. 81-230. Complainant opposes Respondent's motion. The Order of Default which Respondent seeks to have set aside was issued on November 4, 1981, because Respondent had not filed its Answer within the period provided in the Rules of Practice for filing an Answer, as extended by Order of an Administrative Law Judge.

Respondent contends that its failure to file a timely Answer resulted from confusion caused by the withdrawal of its counsel. According to Respondent it believed that its counsel had withdrawn from representation with respect to matters other than the specific complaint filed in this case. Respondent's contention, which is supported by an affidavit of Bradley A. Williams who is identified as an authorized representative of Respondent, is contradicted by the Motion to Withdraw Representation filed by its counsel on November 2, 1981. That motion states that Respondent's counsel personally advised Bradley Williams of Starr Retailers by telephone of the consequences of failure to answer the complaint and was specifically instructed by Bradley Williams not to file an Answer. In view of counsel's statement in its Motion to Withdraw Representation, Respondent's Motion to Set Aside Default with the supporting affidavit is not persuasive that there was any confusion with respect to counsel's continued participation in this case or the consequences of a failure to file an Answer.

The affidavit of Mr. Williams asserts that Respondent thought a "consent decree order" was being negotiated between its attorney and the Postal Service and that it was willing to sign such consent decree and felt all along that its case would be settled by such a decree. Following receipt of Respondent's Motion to Set Aside the Default and Complainant's opposition thereto, a telephone conference was held with the parties and Respondent was given an opportunity to enter into a Consent Agreement. Over three months has passed since Respondent was afforded an opportunity to enter into a Consent Agreement and no executed Consent Agreement has been filed. The failure to enter into a Consent Agreement is not consistent with the assertion in Mr. Williams' affidavit that he was willing to sign a consent decree.

For the foregoing reasons, Respondent's motion does not establish that the default should be set aside. Accordingly, the Motion is denied.