In the Matter of the Complaint Against

 INTERNATIONAL FUNDING AND FINANCE CO.,INC. (I.F.F.),
 10919 Barrington Court at
 Cincinnati, OH 45242

 and

 SALLY GREENBERG INTERNATIONAL FUNDING AND FINANCE CO., INC. (I.F.F.),
 West Steger Road at
 Monee, IL 60449

 P.S. Docket No. 10/86
 
 June 10, 1981
 
 Quentin E. Grant Administrative Law Judge

 APPEARANCE FOR COMPLAINANT:
 H. Richard Hefner, Esq.
 Robert Hausman, Esq.
 Law Department
 United States Postal Service
 Washington, DC 20260-6100

 APPEARANCE FOR RESPONDENT:
 Martin S. Pinales, Esq.
 Sirkin, Pinales & Schwartz
 Suite 832
 105 West Fourth Street
 Cincinnati, OH 45202

In a Complaint filed on January 28, 1981, Respondent was alleged to be engaged in a scheme or device to obtain money or property through the mails by means of false representations in violation of 39 U.S.C. 3005. Complainant seeks a mail stop order pursuant to that statute with respect to Respondent's activities as a purported financial consultant or financial broker in which it utilizes a contract entitled "FINANCIAL SERVICES AGREEMENT."

The specific substance of the Complaint is that by means of advertisements, published in newspapers and direct mail solicitations, calculated to induce readers thereof to remit money through the mails, Respondent makes materially false representations that Respondent will function as a "broker" (act as intermediary or agent) obtaining loans for the "client" and that fees paid to Respondent by the "client" are used for processing loans (i.e., "credit investigation, titles, examination of deeds, etc.").

Respondent moved for extension of time to file an answer and a continuance of the hearing for a period of 45-days or longer pending the outcome of a Grand Jury Investigation of Respondent. The undersigned issued an order granting a short extension of time to file an answer and a 14-day continuance of the hearing stating that the full extension requested by Respondent would be granted only if Respondent would agree to detention of its mail pending the conclusion of this administrative proceeding. Respondent did not indicate willingness to enter into a mail detention agreement. It filed answers denying all allegations of the Complaint.

The hearing was held on April 3, 1981. Respondent offered no evidence but through Counsel cross-examined Complainant's witnesses. Complainant has filed proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law. Respondent has not availed itself of the opportunity it was given to do so. All of Complainant's proposed findings and conclusions have been fully considered and, to the extent indicated, have been adopted. Otherwise they have been rejected as unsupported by or contrary to the evidence or because of their irrelevance or immateriality.

1. By means of advertisements placed in newspapers reading typically as follows Respondent solicits telephonic inquiries concerning "signature only" loans requiring no collateral (CX-10, 11):

SIGNATURE Only Loans:  $1000-
$25,000; no collateral.  
Call 513-793-2984, 24 hours.

2. Based on the testimony of Complainant's witnesses, Postal Inspectors James A. Dahl and Robert Chitwood (Tr. 4-46), I find that persons making telephone inquiries in response to such advertisements receive from Respondent, using the names and addresses set forth in the caption of the Complaint, proposed contracts (entitled "FINANCIAL SERVICE AGREEMENT") to be signed by the inquirers and returned to Respondent by mail with a money order or check in the amount of $50.00 (CX-6, 7, 17, 19). The $50.00 9s represented by Respondent to be a fee to cover the cost of processing loan applications to three loan companies upon receipt of such applications and fee (CX-2, 3, 13, 14).

3. Respondent's I.F.F. brochure (CX-4, 15) and "FINANCIAL SERVICE AGREEMENT"(CX-5, 16) represent that Respondent will act as a broker for clients in arranging loans from lenders developed by Respondent and that the $50.00 fee is an advance processing and placement fee covering expenses connected with the loans such as credit investigations, titles, examination of deeds, etc.

4. Respondent solicits and receives signed Financial Service Agreements and accompanying $50.00 fees through the mails (CX-3, 20).

5. A broker is one who acts as an intermediary or an agent who negotiates contracts. Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary (1980).

6. Respondent has no arrangement, agreement, or contract with lending institutions to process loans for its "clients" (Tr. 23, 45-54).

7. The only action taken by Respondent under Financial Service Agreements was to send an unsigned handwritten note to lending institutions such as Citi-Corp. and Postal Financial Services requesting that a loan application be sent to a certain name and address (not identified as a "client" of Respondent) (Tr. 23-26, 47-54; CX-21-24).

8. Most "clients" heard nothing further from Respondent, (except upon registering complaints) after mailing signed Financial Service Agreements and processing fees, did not receive loans, and did not receive refunds of processing fees from Respondent (Tr. 26-38, 44, 45; CX-25-33).

9. Respondent does not function in any real sense as a broker to obtain loans for clients and does not use the fees paid by clients to process loans (i.e., "credit investigation, titles, examination of deeds, etc.").

10. Attached hereto as Exhibits A, B, C, and D are copies of a typical newspaper advertisement, promotional material, and Financial Services Agreement employed by Respondent in the scheme described above.

1. The meaning of advertising representations is to be judged from a consideration of an advertisement in its totality and the impression it would most probably create in ordinary minds. Donaldson v. Read Magazine , 333 U.S. 178 (1948); Vibra-Brush Corp. v. Schaffer , 152 F. Supp. 461 (S.D.N.Y. 1957); Borg-Johnson Electronics v. Christenberry , 169 F. Supp. 746 (S.D.N.Y. 1959). Express representations are not required. It is the net impression which the advertisement is likely to make upon purchasers to whom it is directed which is important, and even if an advertisement is so worded as not to make an express representation, if it is artfully designed to mislead those responding to it the mail fraud statutes are applicable. G. J. Howard v. Cassidy , 162 F. Supp. 568. See also Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Council , 425 U.S. 748 (1976).

2. Applying the foregoing standards, I find that Respondent's advertisements make the representations alleged in the Complaint.

3. The actions taken by Respondent following receipt of signed Financial Services Agreements and the $50.00 processing and placement fees do not in any way resemble the acts of a bona fide broker. The fees are not used for processing loans (i.e., "Credit investigation, titles, examination of deeds, etc.") as represented in the Financial Service Agreement. Therefore, the representations made by Respondent as alleged in the Complaint and found above are grossly false in fact and are material since their obvious effect is to induce readers of Respondent's solicitation material to remit the "processing" fee.

4. Respondent is engaged in the conduct of a scheme for obtaining remittances of money through the mails by means of materially false representations in violation of 39 U.S.C. 3005.

5. An order pursuant to that statute in the form attached should be issued against Respondent.