In the Matter of the Petition by ) June 23, 1976 ) THE H. W. WILSON COMPANY ) 950 University Avenue ) Bronx, New York 10452 ) ) ) P.S. Docket No. 2/66 Revocation of Second-Class Mail ) Privileges for "CUMULATIVE BOOK INDEX" ) "INDEX TO LEGAL PERIODICALS", "READERS' ) GUIDE TO PERIODICAL LITERATURE", ) "EDUCATION INDEX", "ABRIDGED READERS' ) GUIDE TO PERIODICAL LITERATURE", ) "BIOLOGICAL & AGRICULTURAL INDEX", ) "SOCIAL SCIENCES & HUMANITIES INDEX", ) and "APPLIED SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY INDEX" ) APPEARANCES FOR PETITIONER: John L. Warden, Esq. Thomas A. Grant, Esq. Sullivan & Cromwell New York, New York APPEARANCES FOR RESPONDENT: Grayson M. Poats, Esq. Law Department U. S. Postal Service Washington, D.C. Lussier, Edward F.
The instant proceeding is before the undersigned on appeal by H. W. Wilson Company, the Petitioner herein, from the Initial Decision of Chief Administrative Law Judge William A. Duvall upholding the revocation of second-class mail privileges for the publications in issue. Petitioner has taken two basic exceptions to the Initial Decision. Respondent has not filed any exceptions to the Initial Decision but has filed a Reply Brief contesting Petitioner's exceptions.
Petitioner's first exception is to the conclusion that the publications are not periodicals within the meaning of the postal laws and regulations since they do not contain articles. Its second exception claims error in dismissing, without greater explanation, the past practice of granting the privilege. Both exceptions must fail on their merits.
The arguments in support of the exceptions are essentially the same arguments quite thoroughly briefed by Petitioner before Judge Duvall and, in my judgment, adequately and properly resolved by him in the Initial Decision. Allowance of either exception requires a complete reversal of a long line of cases litigated for the Administrative Law Judges of the Postal Service, affirmed in final decisions of the Postal Service issued by the Judicial Officer and, where taken to court, upheld. Further amplification of the Initial Decision is unnecessary but note may be taken that whatever surface impression of reasonableness exists in Petitioner's contention that current information in any form is a sufficient basis for finding a publication a periodical providing the other technical requirements for periodical publications are met, quickly vaporizes when one considers its practical effect of extending the perimeters of eligibility for the cheaper second-class mail rate to near infinity. There are very few publications of any sort that could not, in one way or another, be said to convey current information and as pointed out by the United States Supreme Court in Hannegan v. Esquire, Inc., 327 U.S. 146 (1946), it is not within the province of the postal authorities to make value judgments on the worth of a particular publication in carrying out the statutory responsibility to implement the laws related to second-class mail.
While Petitioner contends that Hannegan v. Esquire, Inc., supports its definition of a periodical the court there saw fit to refer to Houghton v. Payne, 194 U.S. 88 (1904), as still viable and the many intervening years reveal no court or final agency decisions other than reaffirming the definition of a periodical set forth in the Houghton case. The Initial Decision also appropriately referred to the explicit rejection by the Court in that case of the contention that past practice creates any prescriptive right to second-class mail privileges improvidently granted. See also in this connection, Shepard's Citations, Inc., P.S. Docket No. 1/88; Northwest Missouri State University, P.S. Docket No. 3/42, and University of Oregon, P.S. Docket No. 3/110.
The exceptions to the Initial Decision are accordingly disallowed and the Initial Decision is hereby affirmed.