In the Matter of the Petition by ) November 4, 1975 ) NATIONAL LAWYERS GUILD ) SAN FRANCISCO BAY AREA CHAPTER ) 558 Capp Street ) San Francisco, California 94110 ) ) Denial of Application for Second- ) Class Mail Privileges for "THE ) CONSPIRACY" ) P.S. Docket No. 3/127 APPEARANCES: Martin Fassler,Esq. Stephen Kaus, Esq. 942 Market Street, Suite 608 San Francisco, California 94102 for Petitioner Grayson M. Poats, Esq. Law Department United States Postal Service Washington, D.C. 20260 for Respondent Lussier, Edward F.
The subject proceeding is before the undersigned on appeal by Petitioner, the National Lawyers Guild, San Francisco Bay Area Chapter, from an Initial Decision by the Chief Administrative Law Judge upholding the denial of its application for second-class mail privileges for its publication "The Conspiracy". The sole issue in this case, as pointed out in the Initial Decision, is whether Petitioner is a "strictly professional" society under former Title 39 United States Code Section 4355a(8) as now incorporated in Section 132.232 of the Postal Service Manual.
The Initial Decision found, and there is no dispute as to the finding, that membership in the National Lawyers Guild is open to lawyers, persons in law school, persons who have completed law school, persons who for at least six months out of the 24 months preceding application have worked for the National Lawyers Guild, a law office, legal collective or commune, legal services organization, community legal defense office or law school and to prison inmates who are "jailhouse lawyers". Half of Petitioner's 900 members are lawyers and half fall into the other classifications with some 200 falling into the classification of "jailhouse lawyers".
In reference to the membership classification other than lawyers and law students, Petitioner's Brief states that they are "admittedly somewhat unorthodox and perhaps the membership qualifications might have been more artfully drafted but this is a sincere effort to attempt to educate and involve those who are genuinely interested in and involved with the legal system and the Postal Service's refusal to recognize this is unreasonable". Petitioner also contends that the emphasis upon membership qualifications does not give sufficient importance to the purposes and functioning of the organization and that the emphasis upon "official recognition as practitioners" in a particular field in determining whether an organization is a "strictly professional" society is arbitrary and unreasonable. It would read the word "professional" as being used in contrast to "commercial".
In my view Petitioner's reading of the words "strictly professional" is far too broad and would expand the plain language of the statute beyond reason. Whether a state license to practice as a professional in a particular field is an absolute requirement for a "strictly professional" society is not necessary to decide in this case for it is crystal clear that the composition of membership in Petitioner's organization removes it entirely from the normal and reasonable meaning to be given to the words "strictly professional" society. Petitioner's argument concentrates on "professional" and conveniently overlooks the adjective "strictly" which must be given meaning also. An organization with the scopy of membership factually found in the instant case is not encompassed within that definition and neither the purpose nor the functioning of the National Lawyers Guild, as shown from the record, support reaching a contrary result in the case. Accordingly, Petitioner's exceptions to the Initial Decision are disallowed and the decision to deny Petitioner's application for recognition as a "strictly professional society" is upheld.