In the Matter of the Petition by ) April 6, 1972 ) INTERRELIGIOUS FOUNDATION FOR ) COMMUNITY ORGANIZATION, INC. ) 475 Riverside Drive ) New York, New York 10027 ) ) Denial of Second-Class Mail Privileges ) for "IFCO NEWS" ) P.S. Docket No. 1/10 APPEARANCES: Frank Patton, Jr., Esq. Ellis, Stringfellow, Patton & Leibovitz 51 East 42nd Street New York, New York 10017 for Petitioner Arthur S. Cahn, Esq. Law Department United States Postal Service Washington, D.C. 20260 for Respondent Wenchel, Adam G.
The Petitioner in the above-captioned proceeding had sought a second-class mailing permit for the
Petitioner's publication IFCO NEWS under the special conditions
applicable to publications of certain
organizations including churches and church organizations as authorized by section 4355(a) of former title 39 U.S.C.
1/ The Director, Office of Mail Classification, denied the application on
grounds that the Petitioner is not a church or church organization within the meaning of 39 U.S.C. 4355(a).
Thereupon, Petitioner filed a petition with the Docket Clerk appealing the Director's action. In accordance with a
stipulation of the parties and pursuant to the consent of the Chief Hearing Examiner, the appeal was submitted for
decision on the record without presentation of oral testimony. The Chief Hearing Examiner's Initial Decision held
Petitioner to be entitled to a second-class mail permit under 39 U.S.C. 4355(a) as a church organization. From that
Decision the Respondent Director appeals.
There is no substantial dispute over the facts. The question is one of law. It is agreed that Petitioner is an organization primarily composed of national church denominations, their boards, departments or commissions.
The Director denied the application on the premise that "The term 'church or church organization' as used in the law embraces churches on the organizational level of an individual congregation and organizational units of an individual congregation."
As an interdenominational coordinating organization for stated functions, Petitioner does not fit that definition. Petitioner argues that "church" as used in the applicable law comprehends national church denominations. If that view is correct, Petitioner is entitled to the permit. If Respondent's view of the law quoted above is correct, then the permit was properly denied.
Section 4355(a) of former title 39 U.S.C. as codified by P.L. 86- 682 reads in part:
"(a) Mailable periodical publications meeting the first three conditions of section 4354(a) of this title are entitled to be entered and mailed as second class mail when they do not contain advertising other than that of the publisher and if they are--
* * * * *
"(9) published by a church or church organization***".
The predecessor of section 4355(a) was a provision in the Post Office Department Appropriation Act of 1913, which had been amended at various times and codified as 39 U.S.C. 229. The last amendment was made by P.L. 170, 84th Congress, on July 26, 1955. That Act added "churches and church organizations" to the categories of publishers granted favorable conditions for entry of their publication as second class mail. It is the meaning of this phrase with which we are concerned in this proceeding.
Although Petitioner considers itself a "church organization" as that term is used in section 4355 rather than a "church", the meaning of the word "church" that Congress intended must be considered before examining the term "church organization". The difficulty here arises from the fact that the word "church" may be used in a variety of senses, including a group of worshippers, a religious denomination, or all Christmas.
Decisions of the Post Office Department's Judicial Officer have previously considered whether certain collections of persons were to be considered groups of worshippers and therefore churches. 2/
There has, however, been no occasion for either the Post Office Department's Judicial Officer or the Postal Service's Judicial Officer to consider whether the word "church" in the phrase "church or church organization" is to be accorded a broader meaning.
Petitioner argues that "A national church, such as the United Presbyterian Church in the United States of America, is entitled to tax exemption as a 'church' under the Internal Revenue Code", but does not cite the code section involved. The most familiar provisions of the Internal Revenue Code applying to churches actually use the broader term "religious" as in "religious, charitable * * * or educational purposes" IRC ?? 170(c)(2)(B) and 501(c)(3). The word "church", however, is used a number of times in the Internal Revenue Code. But, insofar as the Judicial Officer is aware, it is coupled in each case with other words either making it unnecessary to determine whether "church" is used in a sense, including a national or international body or implying that it is not so used. See for example, IRC ?? 170(b)(1)(A)(i), 512(b)(16), 514(b)(3)(E) and (c)(1), 3309(b)(1) and 7605(c) "a church or convention or association of churches"; § 512(b)(12) "each individual church, district or other local unit"; and § 6033(a)(2)(A)(i) "churches, their integrated auxiliaries and conventions or associations of churches". Thus, whatever value an interpretation of the word "church" as used in the Internal Revenue Code might have in the instant proceeding, interpretations of the Internal Revenue Code do not help in the interpretation of the Postal Law involved here.
Leglislative history of the law is meager since both houses of Congress passed H.R. 4585 which became P.L. 170, without discussion.
However, the members of Congress did have committee reports before them when the bill was passed and must be regarded as having understood the legislation as explained in those reports. These reports refer to "local churches", and "national church organizations" 3/ clearly demonstrating the word "church" was considered to mean only local congregations of worshippers and "church organizations" was used to extend the applicability of P.L. 170 to the national organization of churches.
For the reasons given above, it is concluded that Petitioner does not qualify as a "church or church organization" entitled to a second-class mail permit under 39 U.S.C. 4355(a)(9) and since Petitioner does not claim its publication meets the requirements of 39 U.S.C. 4354, the Director's denial of Petitioner's application is affirmed.
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1/ Although 39 U.S.C. 4355(a) is no longer in force, as such, its substance is carried forward in postal regulations. See Postal Service Orders 71-9 and 71-10 (36 F.R. 12451) and section 132.232 Postal Service Manual (39 C.F.R. 132.2(c)(2)). The foregoing regulations must be interpreted and applied in the light of 39 U.S.C. 4355; for convenience, therefore, this decision cites 39 U.S.C. 4355 rather than the applicable regulations.